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EXPERIENCE-WEIGHTED ATTRACTION LEARNING IN
NORMAL FORM GAMES
BY COLIN CAMERER AND TECKHUA HO1
Ž .In ‘experience-weighted attraction’ EWA learning, strategies have attractions that
reflect initial predispositions, are updated based on payoff experience, and determine
Ž .choice probabilities according to some rule e.g., logit . A key feature is a parameter 
that weights the strength of hypothetical reinforcement of strategies that were not chosen
according to the payoff they would have yielded, relative to reinforcement of chosen
strategies according to received payoffs. The other key features are two discount rates, 
and , which separately discount previous attractions, and an experience weight. EWA
Ž .includes reinforcement learning and weighted fictitious play belief learning as special
cases, and hybridizes their key elements. When 0 and 0, cumulative choice
reinforcement results. When 1 and , levels of reinforcement of strategies are
exactly the same as expected payoffs given weighted fictitious play beliefs. Using three sets
of experimental data, parameter estimates of the model were calibrated on part of the
data and used to predict a holdout sample. Estimates of  are generally around .50, 
around .81, and  varies from 0 to . Reinforcement and belief-learning special cases
are generally rejected in favor of EWA, though belief models do better in some
constant-sum games. EWA is able to combine the best features of previous approaches,
allowing attractions to begin and grow flexibly as choice reinforcement does, but reinforc-
ing unchosen strategies substantially as belief-based models implicitly do.
KEYWORDS: Learning, behavioral game theory, reinforcement learning, fictitious play.
1. INTRODUCTION
HOW DOES AN EQUILIBRIUM arise in a noncooperative game? While it is
conceivable that players reason their way to an equilibrium, a more psychologi-
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cally plausible view is that players adapt or evolve toward it.2 The flurry of
recent research on adaptation and evolution mostly explores theoretical ques-
tions, such as to which types of equilibria specific evolutionary or adaptive rules
converge. We are interested in a fundamentally empirical question: Which
models describe human behavior best? In this paper we propose a general
Ž .‘experience-weighted attraction’ EWA model and estimate the model para-
metrically, using three sets of experimental data.
The EWA model combines elements of two seemingly different approaches,
and includes them as special cases. One approach, belief-based models, starts
with the premise that players keep track of the history of previous play by other
players and form some belief about what others will do in the future based on
past observation. Then they tend to choose a best-response, a strategy that
maximizes their expected payoffs given the beliefs they formed.
A different approach, choice reinforcement, assumes that strategies are
‘reinforced’ by their previous payoffs, and the propensity to choose a strategy
depends in some way on its stock of reinforcement. Players who learn by
reinforcement do not generally have beliefs about what other players will do.
They care only about the payoffs strategies yielded in the past, not about the
history of play that created those payoffs.
The belief and reinforcement approaches have been treated as fundamentally
different since the 1950s. Until recently, nobody asked whether the two might be
related, or how. But like two rivers with a surprising common source, or children
raised apart who turn out to be siblings, belief and reinforcement are special
kinds of one learning model. The common heritage of these approaches was
probably not discovered earlier because reinforcement models were used pri-
marily by psychologists, and belief models primarily by decision and game
theorists. In addition, the information used by each approach is quite different.
Ž .Belief-based models do not specially reflect past successes reinforcements of
chosen strategies. Reinforcement models do not reflect the history of how
others played. The EWA approach includes both as special cases by incorporat-
ing both kinds of information, using three modelling features.
The crucial feature is how strategies are reinforced. In the choice reinforce-
ment approach, when player 1 picks strategy s j, and player 2 picks sk, player 1’s1 2
j Ž j k .strategy s is reinforced according to the payoff  s , s . Unchosen strategies1 1 1 2
hŽ .s h j are not reinforced at all. In EWA, the unchosen strategies are1
Ž h k .reinforced based on a multiple  of the payoffs  s , s they would have1 1 2
earned. This makes psychological sense because research on human and animal
learning shows that people learn from many kinds of experiences other than
those that are directly reinforcing. An expanded notion of reinforcement there-
fore liberates learning from the straitjacket of behaviorist psychology, toward
something more cognitive and descriptive of humans.
2 Like most good ideas in economics, the adaptive and evolutionary interpretations of equilibra-
Ž .tion have a long pedigree. Weibull 1997 pointed out that in Adam Smith’s famous passage where
he said that the division of labor emerged as a consequence of the ‘‘propensity to truck, barter, and
exchange,’’ Smith also noted that the division of labor emerged in a ‘‘very slow and gradual’’ way
Ž .1981 .
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The second EWA feature controls the growth rates of attractions. Attractions
are numbers that are monotonically related to the probability of choosing a
strategy. In cumulative reinforcement models attractions can grow and grow,
Žwhich implies that convergence can be sharper in the sense that choice
.probabilities diverge toward one and zero . In belief learning, attractions are
expected payoffs, which are always bounded by the range of matrix payoffs. The
EWA model allows growth rates to vary between these two bounds by using
separate decay rates,  for past attractions, and  for the amount of experience
Ž .which normalizes attractions .
The third modelling feature is initial attraction and experience weight. In
belief models initial attractions must be expected payoffs given prior beliefs. In
reinforcement models initial attractions are usually unrestricted. Therefore,
initial attractions are unrestricted in EWA too. The initial experience weight
Ž .N 0 reflects a strength of prior in belief models, or the relative weight given to
lagged attractions versus payoffs when attractions are updated.
Ž .When 0, 0, and N 0 1, the EWA attractions of strategies are equal
Žto reinforcements, as used in many models. When 1, and  and initial
.attractions are determined by prior beliefs , the attractions of strategies are
equal to their expected payoffs given beliefs in a general class. That is, reinforc-
Ž .ing each strategy according to what it would have earned or did earn is
behaviorally equivalent to forming beliefs, based on observed history, and
calculating expected payoffs. The equivalence holds because looking back at
Ž .what strategies earned or would have in the past is the same as forming beliefs
based on what others did in the past, then computing forward-looking expected
payoffs based on those backward-looking beliefs.
EWA tries to mix appropriate elements of reinforcement and belief learning
approaches in a way that makes sense. We think this can be judged by whether
the parameters have clear psychological interpretations, and whether adding
Ž .them improves statistical fit adjusting, of course, for added degrees of freedom
and predictive accuracy. To test the empirical usefulness of EWA, we derived
maximum-likelihood parameter estimates from three data sets. The data sets
span a wide range of games: constant-sum games with unique mixed-strategy
equilibria; coordination games with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria; and ‘p-
beauty contests’ with unique dominance-solvable equilibria. Some empirical
studies have evaluated belief and reinforcement models, but most have not
compared them directly with statistical tests. Because EWA is a generalization
which reduces to belief and reinforcement learning when parameters have
certain values, it is easy to compare them to EWA and to each other.
In the next section, the EWA approach is defined and we show how a general
class of choice reinforcement and adaptive belief-based approaches are special
cases. The third section provides interpretations of the model parameters and
discusses how they relate to principles of human learning. The fourth section
describes previous findings and shows how our empirical implementation goes
further than earlier work. The fifth section reports parameter estimates from
several data sets. The last section concludes and mentions some future research
directions.
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Ž .2. THE EXPERIENCE-WEIGHTED ATTRACTION EWA MODEL
We start with notation. We study n-person normal-form games. Players are
Ž .indexed by i i1, . . . , n , and the strategy space of player i, S consists of mi i
 1 2 j m i1 mi4discrete choices, that is, S  s , s , . . . , s , . . . , s , s . SS  . . .S isi i i i i i 1 n
the Cartesian product of the individual strategy spaces and is the strategy space
of the game. s S denotes a strategy of player i, and is therefore an element ofi i
Ž .S . s s , . . . , s S is a strategy combination, and it consists of n strategies,i 1 n
Ž .one for each player. s  s , . . . , s , s , . . . , s is a strategy combination ofi 1 i1 i1 n
all players except i. S has a cardinality of m  n m . The scalar-i i k1, k i k
Ž .valued payoff function of player i is  s , s . Denote the actual strategyi i i
Ž . Ž .chosen by player i in period t by s t , and the strategy vector chosen by alli
Ž . Ž Ž . Ž ..other players by s t . Denote player i’s payoff in a period t by  s t , s t .i i i i
EWA assumes each strategy has a numerical attraction, which determines the
Ž .probability of choosing that strategy in a precise way made clear below .
Learning models require a specification of initial attractions, how attractions are
updated by experience, and how choice probabilities depend on attractions.
2.1. The EWA Updating Rules
The core of the EWA model is two variables which are updated after each
Ž .round. The first variable is N t , which we interpret as the number of ‘observa-
jŽ .tion-equivalents’ of past experience. The second variable is A t , player i’si
attraction of strategy s j after period t has taken place.i
Ž . jŽ . Ž .The variables N t and A t begin with some prior values, N 0 andi
jŽ .A 0 .These prior values can be thought of as reflecting pregame experience,i
either due to learning transferred from different games or due to introspection.
Ž Ž .Then N 0 can be interpreted as the number of periods of actual experience,
.which is equivalent in attraction impact to the pregame thinking.
Updating is governed by two rules. First,
Ž . Ž . Ž .2.1 N t N t1 1, t1.
The parameter  is a depreciation rate or retrospective discount factor that
measures the fractional impact of previous experience, compared to one new
period.
The second rule updates the level of attraction. A key component of the
updating is the payoff that a strategy either yielded, or would have yielded, in a
period. The model weights hypothetical payoffs that unchosen strategies would
have earned by a parameter  , and weights payoffs actually received, from
Ž . Ž .chosen strategy s t , by an additional 1 so they receive a total weight of 1 .i
Ž .Using an indicator function I x, y that equals 1 if xy and 0 if xy, the
 Ž . Ž j Ž .. Ž j Ž ..weighted payoff can be written as  1 I s , s t  s , s t .i i i i i
jŽ .The rule for updating attraction sets A t to be the sum of a depreciated,i
jŽ . Ž .experience-weighted previous attraction A t1 plus the weighted payoffi
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from period t, normalized by the updated experience weight:
Ž . jŽ .  Ž . Ž j Ž .. Ž j Ž ..N t1 A t1   1 I s , s t  s , s ti i i i i ijŽ . Ž .2.2 A t  .i Ž .N t
The factor  is a discount factor or decay rate, which depreciates previous
attraction.
2.2. Choice Reinforcement
Ž .In early reinforcement models and some recent ones choice probabilities are
Ž Ž . Ž ..updated directly e.g., Bush and Mosteller 1955 ; cf. Cross 1983 . In more
Ž Ž . Ž ..recent models Harley 1981 ; Roth and Erev 1995 , strategies have levels of
reinforcement or propensity that are incremented cumulatively by received
Ž Ž ..payoffs and perhaps normalized; Arthur 1991 . We emphasize the latter
cumulative form, which gives more modelling freedom3 and avoids some clumsy
Žtechnical features e.g., imposing boundary conditions so probabilities do not
.grow above one or below zero .
j jŽ .The initial reinforcement level of strategy s of player i is R 0 . These initiali i
Ž .reinforcements can be assumed a priori based on a theory of first-period play
or estimated from the data. Reinforcements are updated according to two
principles:
jŽ . Ž j Ž .. j Ž .R t1  s , s t if s s t ,i i i i i ijŽ . Ž .2.3 R t i j j½ Ž . Ž .R t1 if s s t .i i i
The two principles can be reduced to a single updating equation:
Ž . jŽ . jŽ . Ž j Ž .. Ž j Ž ..2.4 R t R t1 I s , s t  s , s t .i i i i i i i
It is easy to see that this updating formula is a special case of the EWA rule,
Ž .when 0, N 0 1, and 0. Thus, cumulative choice reinforcement in this
form is a special case of experience-weighted attraction learning.4
Other reinforcement models assume that previous payoffs are averaged,
Ž Ž . Ž .rather than cumulated McAllister 1991 , Mookerjhee and Sopher 1994, 1997 ,
3In the Cross model, strategies have utilities that are weighted averages of past utilities and
Ž . Ž .current payoffs for chosen strategies , and players maximize utility. Sarin 1995 shows that when
the weight on current payoff declines over time, this model behaves similarly to the Harley version
in which attractions grow. The similarity reflects the fact that both models build in a declining effect
of marginal reinforcements.
4 Ž .Some reinforcement models add other parameters. Roth and Erev 1995 add a parameter that
Ž .cuts off attractions close to zero, to avoid negative attractions. Erev and Roth 1997 add three
Ž . Žparameters that allow reinforcement to depend on payoffs minus an updated reference point as in
Ž . Ž ..Bush and Mosteller 1995 , Cross 1983 , where the updating may be different for losses and gains.
They also add a parameter that smears a portion of the chosen-strategy reinforcement to neighbor-
Ž .ing strategies, to reflect a kind of experimentation or generalization that is locally similar to our 
Ž .parameter. Camerer and Ho 1998 compare the local-generalization specification with  updating
in the EWA model and find that local-generalization fits much worse.
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Ž ..Sarin and Vahid 1997 . Then reinforcements are updated according to
Ž . jŽ . jŽ . Ž . Ž j Ž .. Ž j Ž ..2.5 R t R t1  1 I s , s t  s , s t .i i i i i i i
Ž . Ž .When 0, N 0 1 1 and , EWA reduces to this averaged-
reinforcement form.
2.3. Belief-based Models
In a belief-based model, players tend to choose strategies that have high
expected payoffs given beliefs formed by observing the history of what others
did. While there are many ways of forming beliefs, we consider a fairly large
class of weighted fictitious play models, which include familiar ones like ficti-
Ž Ž .. Ž . Žtious play Brown 1951 and Cournot 1960 best-response as special cases see
Ž . Ž .. 5Fundenberg and Levine 1995, 1998 , Cheung and Friedman 1997 .
In the weighted fictitious play model, prior beliefs of opponents’ strategy
combinations are expressed as a ratio of hypothetical counts of observations of
k k Ž .strategy combination s , denoted by N 0 . These observations can then bei i
Žnaturally integrated with actual observations as experience accumulates. Carnap
Ž .1962 shows an elegant set of axioms that implies this structure, which corre-
.sponds to Bayesian updating with a Dirichlet-distributed prior. In our view,
Žspecifying prior beliefs and computing initial expected payoffs based on the
.prior is a crucial feature of belief models, though some papers have not
imposed this assumption. Without specifying a prior, there is no guarantee that
the updated beliefs that result from mixing initial expected payoffs with later
Ž .experience will be valid beliefs i.e., nonnegative probabilities that sum to one .
We also allow past experience to be depreciated or discounted by a factor 
Ž .presumably between zero and one . Formally, the prior beliefs for player i
about choices of others are specified by a vector of relative frequencies of
k k Ž .choices of strategies s , denoted N 0 . Call the sum of those frequenciesi i
Ž . Ž . mi k Ž .dropping the player subscript for simplicity N t Ý N t . Then thek1 i
k Ž .initial prior B 0 isi
k Ž .N 0ikŽ . Ž .2.6 B 0  ,i Ž .N 0
k Ž . Ž .with N 0 0 and N 0 0. Beliefs are updated by depreciating the previousi
counts by , and adding one for the strategy combination actually chosen by the
other players. That is,
k Ž . Ž k Ž ..N t1 I s , s ti i ikŽ . Ž .2.7 B t  .i m h hi Ž . Ž Ž ..Ý N t1 I s , s th1 i i i
5When the description ‘fictitious play’ is used below, we mean traditional fictitious play in which
Ž . Ž .all past observations are weighted equally. Also, Crawford 1995 and Camerer and Ho 1998
estimate models in which  varies across periods, which generalizes weighted fictitious play to
include cases where the weight rises or falls over time. In both papers, allowing time-varying weight
does not improve fit very much, so assuming a fixed  seems reasonable.
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Expressing beliefs in terms of previous-period beliefs,
Ž k Ž ..I s , s ti ik Ž .B t1 i Ž .N t1kŽ . Ž .2.8 B t i 1
 Ž .N t1
Ž . k Ž . Ž k Ž ..N t1 B t1 I s , s ti i i .Ž .N t1 1
This form of belief updating weights observations from one period ago 
times as much as the most recent observation. This includes Cournot dynamics
Ž . Ž0; only the most recent observation counts and fictitious play 1; all
.observations count equally as special cases. The general case 0		1 is a
compromise in which all observations count but more recent observations count
more.
jŽ .Expected payoffs in period t, E t , are taken over beliefs according toi
mi
j j k kŽ . Ž . Ž . Ž .2.9 E t   s , s B t .Ýi i i i i
k1
The crucial step is to express period t expected payoffs as a function of period
Ž . Ž .t1 expected payoffs. Substituting equation 2.8 into 2.9 and rearranging
yields:
Ž . jŽ . Ž j Ž ..N t1 E t1  s , s ti i ijŽ . Ž .2.10 E t  .i Ž .N t1 1
This equation makes the kinship between the EWA and belief approaches
transparent. Formally, suppose initial attractions are equal to expected payoffs
given initial beliefs that arise from the‘experience-equivalent’ strategy counts
k Ž . jŽ . jŽ . mi Ž j k . k Ž .N 0 , so A 0 E 0 Ý  s , s B 0 . Then substituting 1 andi i i k1 i i i i
Ž . into the attraction updating equation 2.2 gives attractions that are
Ž .exactly the same as updated expected payoffs in 2.10 . Hence, the weighted
belief models are a special case of EWA.
The contrast with EWA makes clear that belief models actually make three
separate assumptions: Players’ initial attractions are expected payoffs based on
some prior; players update attractions using EWA with 1; and attractions
Ž .are a weighted average of lagged attractions and payoffs  . We think the
most intuitively appealing assumption is the best-responsiveness to foregone
payoffs embodied in 1, rather than the weighted-average restriction 
or the restriction on first-period play. EWA allows one to separate the three
features of belief learning: Players could have attractions that begin and grow
differently than belief models assume, but update those attractions in a belief-
learning way. Such players are a special kind of EWA learner.
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The close relation between reinforcement and belief learning is surprising
because the two approaches have generally been treated as fundamentally
Ž Ž ..different e.g., Selten 1991, p. 14 . Some authors have extended choice rein-
Žforcement models to include reinforcement using all foregone payoffs McAllis-
Ž .. Ž Ž .ter 1991 or the highest foregone payoffs Roth 1995, pp. 3740 , Roth and
Ž . .Erev 1995 , on market games , without noticing that these extensions make
reinforcement like belief learning.
Some connection between reinforcement and belief learning was recognized
Ž . Žvery recently by others unbeknownst to us . Fudenberg and Levine 1995, pp.
. Ž .10841085 and Cheung and Friedman 1997, p. 5455 both pointed out that
expected payoffs computed using fictitious play beliefs, and based on history, are
asymptotically the same as histories of actual payoffs. But their arguments are
based on long-run asymptotic equivalence between a stationary distribution
Ž . Ž .possible payoffs and a sample from it actual payoffs . Neither explicitly
recognized that even in the short run, there is an exact equivalence between a
Ž . 6general kind of reinforcement learning EWA and weighted fictitious play.
The nonlinear interplay of parameters in the EWA updating rules is why, as a
model of human learning, EWA is potentially superior to simply running a
regression of choices against reinforcements and expected payoffs or combining
the two in a weighted average. Reinforcements and expected payoffs differ in
Ž .three crucial dimensionsinitial attractions and experience weight N 0 , the
weight  on foregone payoffs in updating attractions, and whether attractions
Ž .can grow outside the bounds of possible payoffs which depends on  and  .
EWA is not a convex combination of reinforcement and belief models because
these three dimensions are controlled by separate parameters. For instance, a
weighted average in which expected payoffs are given weight  and reinforce-
ments have weight 1 will update attractions like EWA does, but that
weighted average will not allow the wide range of initial attractions, experience
rates, and growth rates available in EWA.7
2.4. Choice Probabilities
Attractions must determine probabilities of choosing strategies in some way.
jŽ . jŽ . kŽ .P t should be monotonically increasing in A t and decreasing in A ti i i
Ž .where k j . Three forms have been used in previous research: Exponential
Ž . Ž .logit , power, and normal probit . In estimation reported below we use the
6 Ž .  For example, Cheung and Friedman 1997 make their point by ‘‘assum ing for the moment
Ž .very counterfactually! , that the player somehow managed to play both strategies each period.’’
Then ‘‘dropping the counterfactual,’’ they show that the average experienced payoffs will corre-
spond, up to some noise, to expected payoffs. Counterfactual simulation of foregone payoffs is
precisely the mental process invoked by  in EWA. However, the ‘noise’ is correlated with past
observations that are included explicitly in EWA, so the relation between EWA and weighted
fictitious play is exact rather than approximate.
7 Ž .Indeed, Camerer and Ho 1998 show that EWA fits much better than a convex combination of
belief and reinforcement learning, in two coordination games.
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logit function, which is commonly used in studies of choice under risk and
Ž Ž .uncertainty, brand choice, etc. Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985 , Anderson, Palma,
Ž ..and Thisse 1992 , and is given by
e	Ai
jŽ t .
jŽ . Ž .2.11 P t1  .ki m 	A Ž t .i iÝ ek1
The parameter 	 measures sensitivity of players to attractions. Sensitivity
could vary due to the psychophysics of perception or whether subjects are highly
motivated or not. In this probability function, the exponent in the numerator is
j jŽ .just the weighted effect of strategy s ’s attraction, 	A t , on the probability ofi i
choosing strategy s j. Models in which cross-effects of attractions on otheri
Žstrategies’ choice probabilities are allowed have been estimated Mookerjhee
Ž .. 8and Sopher 1997 but we do not have the degrees of freedom to do so.
The logit, power, and probit probability functions each have advantages and
disadvantages. The exponential form has been used to study learning in games
Ž . Ž .by Mookerjhee and Sopher 1994, 1997 , Ho and Weigelt 1996 , and Fudenberg
Ž .and Levine 1998 , and in ‘quantal response equilibrium’ models by Chen,
Ž . Ž .Friedman, and Thisse in press and McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, 1998 . Cheung
Ž .and Friedman 1997 used the probit form. The exponential form is invariant to
9 jŽ .adding a constant to all attractions. As a result, negative values of A 0 arei
permissible, which means one can avoid the difficult question of how to update
attractions when payoffs are negative.10
The power probability form is given by
	jŽ Ž ..A tijŽ . Ž .2.12 P t1  .i 	m ki Ž Ž ..Ý A tk1 i
8 Ž .In Mookerjhee and Sopher 1997 , the exponent in the probability equation numerator is the
mi kŽ .sum of weighted effects of all the attractions, Ý 	 A t , where 	 is the cross-effect ofh1 jk i jk
strategy sk ’s attraction on strategy s j’s score. This model allows cross-effects in which one strategy’si i
attraction can affect other strategies’ choice probabilities differently. These cross-effects are hard to
interpret without knowing more about similarity of strategies or some other basis for one strategy’s
attraction to affect others differently. Nonetheless, they have some significance as a whole in the
MookerjheeSopher analysis of constant-sum games. Estimating them for our median-action and
p-beauty contest data uses up far too many degrees of freedom because there are too many
strategies. Including cross-effects could proceed particularly efficiently if some structural considera-
Ž Ž .tions were used to restrict coefficients a priori as in Sarin and Vahid’s 1997 use of strategy
.similarity .
9 jŽ .As a result, one must normalize A 0 to equal a constant for one value of j in order to identifyi
Žparameters. There is some evidence that adding a constant to payoffs does matter BerebyMeyer
Ž ..and Erev 1997 but there is also evidence that logit fits better than power, so we regard the choice
of proper form as a matter of one’s purpose and yet-unresolved empirical debate.
10 Ž .Borgers and Sarin 1996 avoid this problem by adding x to all other strategies when a chosen
strategy loses x.
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The power form is invariant to multiplying all attractions by a constant.
Ž .Because of this invariance, the parameters N 0 and  make no difference
Ž . 11when the power form is used i.e., they are not identified .
Ž .Depending on one’s purpose, being able to ignore N 0 and  can be an
advantage or disadvantage. For the purpose of distinguishing different models, it
Ž .is a big disadvantage because models impose different restrictions on N 0 and
. By using the power form, the difference between belief-based, reinforcement,
and EWA models, besides initial attractions, is only one parameter,  , rather
than three parameters. For the purposes of estimating any one model reliably,
however, conserving degrees of freedom is good so the power form is better.
Since our main purpose in this paper is comparing models, having the extra tools
to distinguish theories is a large advantage so we use the logit form rather than
the power form. This choice of probability rule is, of course, not an essential
part of the EWA model.
Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether the logit, probit, or power
Ž .forms fit better adjusting for degrees of freedom . Previous studies show
Ž Ž . Ž .roughly equal fits of logit and power Tang 1996 , Chen and Tang 1998 , Erev
Ž .. Žand Roth 1997 or better fits for the logit form over the power form Camerer
Ž ..and Ho 1998 .
3. INTERPRETING EWA PARAMETERS
We think it is crucial to ask how a learning model’s parameters can be
interpreted, what general behavioral principles of learning they capture, and, for
EWA, how they reveal the assumptions implicit in reinforcement and belief
learning. Asking these questions about any learning theory avoids the danger of
adding parameters just to improve statistical fit, without adding new insight or
respecting what is known in other disciplines. In addition, if parameters have
Žnatural psychological interpretations they can be measured in other ways e.g.,
.response times and attention measures and used in psychological modelling.
3.1. Learning Principles, Aspiration Le
els, and 
The parameter  measures the relative weight given to foregone payoffs,
compared to actual payoffs, in updating attractions. This is the most important
parameter in EWA because it shows most clearly the different ways in which
EWA, reinforcement and belief models capture two basic principles of learn-
ingthe law of actual effect and the law of simulated effect.
11 The parameter  disappears because it only appears in the updating equation denominator
Ž .N t1 1 that is common to all attractions and thus cancels out in the power form. Then EWA
jŽ . Ž .attractions at time t depend only on recent payoffs and the product A 0 N 0 . While initial choicei
jŽ .probabilities depend on A 0 only, these probabilities are the same as those that depend oni
jŽ . Ž . Ž Ž . .A 0 N 0 for N 0 0 . As a result, multiplying the initial attractions by an arbitrary constanti
Ž Ž . .makes no difference econometrically, N 0 is not identifiable .
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Ž .Many decades of learning experiments, mostly with nonhuman animal
subjects, show that successful chosen strategies are subsequently chosen more
Ž Ž .often. Behaviorist psychologists call this the ‘law of effect’ Thorndike 1911 ,
Ž ..Herrnstein 1970 . We relabel this the ‘law of actual effect’ because behavior-
ists took it for granted for years that the only effect on subsequent choices was
produced by rewards for actual choices. The behaviorists eschewed ‘mentalist’
constructs like imagination, which allowed the possibility that foregone rewards
could affect the probability of choosing new strategies, until a series of demon-
strations showed that those cognitive constructs are necessary. When applied to
humans playing games with a known payoff matrix, it is sensible to propose a
corollary general principle, the ‘law of simulated effect’. The law of simulated
effect states that unchosen strategies that would have yielded high payoffs
simulated successesare more likely to be chosen subsequently. Many experi-
ments on reinforcement learning are consistent with this principle.12
Furthermore, most research on human and machine learning assumes that
the basic process driving learning is not reinforcement, per se, but the reduction
of errors. Since errors are measured by the difference between what players
received and what they could have received, error-reduction algorithms effec-
tively use both actual payoffs and foregone payoffs.
ŽThis error reduction idea also lies behind learning direction theory Selten
Ž . Ž ..and Stoecker 1986 , Selten 1997 . Learning direction theory presumes players
have a causal understanding of the game that enables them to tell in which
direction they should switch strategies.13 If players know strategies’ foregone
Ž .payoffs, then direction learning predicts they will move weakly in the direction
of higher-forgone payoffs, and away from low foregone payoffs. This is essen-
tially the same prediction as EWA with 1, except that the direction learning
allows inertia in responses, which corresponds to 1 when payoffs are
positive.14 Thus, in our view EWA incorporates the intuition behind direction
learning in a precise way, when the causal structure is known, while direction
Žlearning can more generally apply to situations with known causal structure but
.unknown foregone payoffs in a way yet to be fully specified.
The empirical strengths of the law of effect and the law of simulated effect
are the key to distinguishing different models of learning in games, and are
12 ŽFor example, anxious patients can be taught to fear a picture of a triangle a conditioned
. Ž .stimulus, or CS when it is followed by a loud annoying noise an unconditioned stimulus, or UCS .
When patients are told to simply imagine the UCS several times, their imagination increases the
Ž Ž ..strength of their conditioned fear response to the triangle CS Davey and Matchett 1994 . A
related phenomenon is ‘incubation’, in which presentation of the CS itself increases the fear
Ž Ž ..response Eysenck 1979 . In these cases, people are not learning by direct reinforcement. They
‘learn’ by simply imagining either the UCS’s reinforcement, or the reinforcement that typically
follows a CS.
13 The players’ understanding could be expressed in a causal diagram or map, but this central part
of the theory is not yet developed.
14 When payoffs are negative, 1 in EWA implies players will be likely to move away from
Ž .money-losing chosen strategies which are reinforced fully, and negatively , even moving to strategies
Ž .with larger negative foregone payoffs .
COLIN CAMERER AND TECKHUA HO838
Ž .calibrated by  . Reinforcement insists that only actual effects matter 0 .
Belief models implicitly require that actual and simulated effects are equally
Ž .strong 1 . EWA takes the middle ground.
The parameter  could also be interpreted as creating an endogeneous
aspiration level against which payoffs are compared. Including an aspiration
level is sensible because many studies show that the reinforcement value of a
fixed payoff depends on the aspiration level to which the payoff is compared
Ž Ž .. 15e.g.., Erev and Roth 1997 .
In EWA,  creates an adjustable aspiration level endogeneously. It is easy to
show that reinforcing strategies according to foregone payoffs means the proba-
Ž .bility of a chosen strategy s t only increases if its payoff is larger than  timesi
Žthe average foregone payoff, holding previous attractions constant see our
.working paper for details . Therefore, one can interpret  times the average
foregone payoff in each period as a kind of aspiration level. A larger  creates a
higher aspiration level. Furthermore, the aspiration level adjusts automatically
over time, because it depends on the foregone payoffs in each period. EWA
therefore creates an endogeneous, adjustable aspiration level at no extra para-
metric cost.
If  is interpreted as the weight placed on foregone payoffs, many generaliza-
tions spring to mind. The size of the weight  could depend on the size of the
foregone payoff or on its sign, to allow the possibilities that unusually large or
small foregone payoffs catch a player’s attention, or that players are more
Žsensitive to losses than to gains cf. loss-aversion in risky choices, e.g., Tversky
Ž ..and Kahneman 1992 . If players are more sensitive to foregone payoffs for
strategies that are closer to the chosen strategy, or more similar, then  will
depend on the distance or similarity between each strategy and the chosen
Ž . Ž Ž ..strategy s t cf. Sarin and Vahid 1997 .i
If  is applied to others’ actual payoffs instead of own foregone payoffs, EWA
can be used to capture learning by imitation. Imitation is obviously common,
especially among animals, children, and impressionable teenagers. Payoff-
dependent imitation is also a sensible heuristic behavior in low-information
environments where players do not know what their foregone payoffs are, but
can observe success of other firms. EWA and imitation learning will be approxi-
Ž .mately the same when i games are symmetric, so that another player’s payoffs
Ž .are the same as one’s own foregone payoffs, and ii when there are many
players who choose different strategies, so that a player who imitates others
according to how successful they were is effectively reinforcing a wide range of
her own strategies according to their foregone payoffs. We conjecture that these
are the conditions under which imitation is most common. If so, then imitation
Ž .is just a heuristic way to implement foregone-payoff-based updating a la EWA ,
15 Players who tend to repeat previously-chosen strategies, regardless of their outcomes, reveal a
Ž Ž . Ž ..‘status quo bias’ or ‘habit’ Majure 1994 , Tang, 1996 . This habitual behavior of chosen strategies
can be captured by having an aspiration level that is always lower than the actual payoffs and by a
lack of simulated effect.
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using payoffs of others as the best available proxy for one’s own unknown
payoffs. In this sense, EWA captures some of the intuition underlying imitation,
and perhaps much of its empirical force as well.
3.2. Growth of Attractions,  and 
jŽ . 16The parameter  depreciates past attractions, A t . The parameter i
Ž .depreciates the experience measure N t . It captures decay in the strength of
Žprior beliefs, which can be different than decay of early attraction captured by
. . These factors combine cognitive phenomena like forgetting with a deliberate
tendency to discount old experience when the environment is changing.
One way to interpret  and  is by considering the numerator and denomina-
Ž .tor of the main EWA updating equation 2.2 separately, and thinking about
how reinforcement and belief-based models use these two terms differently. The
Ž . jŽ .  Ž . Ž j Ž .. Ž j Ž ..numerator is N t1 A t1   1 I s , s t  s , s t . Thisi i i i i i
Ž .term is a running total of depreciated attraction, updated by each period’s
Ž .payoffs. The denominator is N t1 1. This term is a running total of
Ž .depreciated periods of experience-equivalence. Reinforcement models essen-
tially keep track of the running total in the numerator, and do not adjust for the
Žnumber of periods of experience-equivalence since 0, the denominator is
.always one . Belief-based models also keep track of the attraction total but
divide by the total number of periods of experience-equivalence. By depreciating
Ž .the two totals at the same rate  , the belief-based models keep the
Ž .‘per-period’ attractions expected payoffs in a range bounded by the game’s
payoffs.
EWA allows attractions to grow faster than an average, but slower than a
cumulative total. An analogy might help illustrate. Instead of determining
Žattractions of strategies, think about evaluating a person for example, an
.athlete, or a senior colleague you might hire based on a stream of lifetime
Žperformances. The reinforcement model evaluates people based on depreci-
.ated lifetime performance. The belief-based models evaluate people based on
Ž .‘average’ depreciated performance. Both statistics are probably useful in
evaluationin hiring a colleague or an athlete, you would want to know lifetime
performance and some kind of performance averaged across experience. One
way to mix the two is to normalize depreciated cumulative performance by
depreciated experience, but depreciate the amount of experience more rapidly.
Then if two people perform equally well on average every year, the person with
10 years of experience is rated somewhere between equally as good and twice as
good as the person with five years of experience. When , EWA models
players who use something in between ‘lifetime’ performance and ‘average’
performance to evaluate strategies.
16 Ž Ž ..A ‘primary effect’ or ‘imprinting’; Cheung and Friedman 1997 in which early observations
are remembered more strongly than recent ones, can be expressed by 1.
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The depreciation rate parameters  and  can also be understood by how
they control slowdown in learning rate or sharpness of convergence. Solving
recursively for steady-state attraction levels shows that those levels equal the
Ž . Ž .ratio 1  1 times the steady-state average payoff. Thus, when 0 as
in reinforcement learning, attractions can end up outside the bounds of payoff
Ž .levels and they grow as large as possible, holding  constant . When , as
in belief-learning, steady-state attraction levels are equal to steady-state average
payoffs. The implication of these two possibilities depends on how attractions
determine probabilities. In the logit probability form, only differences in attrac-
tion levels affect choice probabilities. Therefore, given a fixed value of 	,
attractions that can grow outside the bounds of payoff levels have a wider range
across strategies. This allows the possibility of sharper convergence in the sense
that choice probabilities can converge closer to the boundaries at zero and one.
When attractions are bounded to be close to payoff levels, convergence cannot
be as sharp. In the power probability form, only ratios of attraction levels
matter. Therefore, if attractions grow, the relative impact of new reinforcements
falls; learning slows down. Ceteris paribus, reinforcement learning requires
Ž .convergence to be as sharp as possible in the logit form or requires learning to
Ž .slow down as quickly as possible in the power form , while belief learning
requires the opposite. EWA is able to choose an intermediate value of  that
tailors the sharpness of convergence or rate of learning to the data.
jŽ . Ž .3.3. Initial Attractions A 0 and their Strength N 0i
jŽ .The term A 0 represents the initial attraction, which might be derived fromi
an analysis of the game, from surface similarity between strategies and strategies
jŽ .that were successful in similar games, etc. Belief models restrict the A 0i
strongly by requiring initial attractions to be derived from prior beliefs. This
Ž .requires, for example, that weakly dominated strategies will always have weakly
lower initial attractions than dominant strategies. EWA allows more flexibility.
For example, suppose players make first-period choices randomly, by choosing
what was chosen previously in a different game, by setting each strategy’s initial
Ž .attraction equal to its minimum payoff the maximin rule or maximum payoff
Ž . 17the maximax rule , or by choosing stochastically among selection principles
like payoff-dominance, risk-dominance, loss-avoidance, etc. All these decision
rules are plausible models of first-period play, but none of them generate initial
attractions that are always expected payoffs given some prior beliefs.
We consider the scientific problem of figuring out how people choose their
initial strategies as fundamentally different than explaining how they learn.
17 Making a strategy’s initial attraction equal to its minimum payoff, for example, is implicitly
putting all the belief weight on the choices by others that yield that minimum. But the choices by
others that lead to minima for different strategies are likely to be different. So the implicit beliefs
underlying each attraction will be different.
ATTRACTION LEARNING 841
Leaving initial attractions unrestricted makes them numerical placeholders that
can be filled by a theory of first-period play that supplies attractions as an input
to EWA. That combination would be a complete theory of behavior in games,
from start to finish.
Ž .The initial-attraction weight N 0 appears in the EWA model to allow players
in belief-based models to have an initial prior that has a certain strength
Ž . Ž .measured in units of actual experience . In EWA, N 0 is therefore naturally
interpreted as the strength of initial attractions, relative to incremental changes
Ž .in attractions due to actual experience and payoffs. Fixing N 0 1 means that,
jŽ .unit for unit, initial attractions A 0 and chunks of reinforcement from payoffsi
are weighed equally when attractions are updated. This is easiest to see by fixing
1 for simplicity and directly computing the attraction after two periods,
jŽ .A 2 , which givesi
2 jŽ . Ž . Ž j Ž .. Ž j Ž .. A 0 N 0  s , s 1  s , s 2i i i i i i ijŽ . Ž .3.1 A 2  .i 2 Ž . N 0 1
The parameter  captures the declining weight placed on payoffs from more
Ždistant periods of actual experience, compared to more recent periods. That is,
Ž j Ž ..the older period 1 payoff  s , s 1 is weighted by  but the recent period 2i i i
Ž j Ž .. .payoff  s , s 2 is not. Like previous payoffs, the initial attraction is alsoi i i
Ž 2 .weighted by a power of   , because it ‘happened’ two periods earlier , but is
Ž . Ž .also weighted by N 0 . Thus, the parameter N 0 captures the special weight
placed on the initial attractions, compared to increments in attraction due to
Ž . Ž .payoffs. N 0 can therefore be thought of as a‘pre-game introspective experi-
Ž .ence’ weight. If N 0 is small the effect of the initial attractions is quickly
Ž .displaced by experience. If N 0 is large then the effect of the initial attractions
persists.
Ž . Ž .Notice that updating the experience-weight by N t N t1 1 implies
Ž .a steady-state value of N*1 1 . In estimation, we have found it useful to
Ž . Ž . Ž .restrict N 0 to be less than N*. This implies N t1 	N t ; the experience
Ž .weight is weakly rising over time. Since the relative weight on decayed
attractions, compared to recent reinforcement, is always increasing, the relative
weight on observed payoffs is always declining. This implies a ‘law of declining
effect’ that is widely observed in research of learning.
The flexibility of initial attractions and experience weight allows one to fit a
variety of models. Theories of equilibrium behavior are special cases in which all
‘learning’ occurs before the game starts. For example, a ‘stubborn’ game-theo-
jŽ .retically-minded player sets A 0 equal to the equilibrium payoffs of eachi
Ž . Žstrategy and act as if N 0 is infinite meaning that no amount of game-playing
.experience can outweigh the prior calculation . An adaptive game theorist
jŽ . Ž .assumes A 0 are equilibrium payoffs but has a small N 0 , so she learns fromi
experience. A player who does not begin with prior beliefs, but updates accord-
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ing to experience as a belief learner does, has  and 1 with arbitrary
jŽ .A 0 .i
4. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Ž ŽIn this section we briefly summarize previous research see Camerer in
. .progress for more details .
Ž .Several papers investigate only belief learning. Cheung and Friedman 1997
Ž .CF estimated a weighted fictitious play model on individual-level data from
Ž .four games hawkdove, stag hunt, ‘buyer seller’ and battle-of-the-sexes . They
find substantial heterogeneity across subjects but stability across games in
parameters that are like our  and 	. A more general belief model, allowing
idiosyncratic shocks in beliefs and time-varying weights, was developed by
Ž . Ž .Crawford 1995 to fit data from coordination games, extended by Broseta 1995
Ž .to allow ARCH error terms, and applied by Crawford and Broseta 1998 to
Ž .coordination with preplay auctions. Brandts and Holt in press and Cooper,
Ž .Garvin, and Kagel in press simulate fictitious play in signaling games. Boylan
Ž .and El-Gamal 1992 compare fictitious play and Cournot learning in coordina-
tion and dominance-solvable games; they find overwhelming relative support for
fictitious play.
Other studies concentrate only on reinforcement learning. Versions of rein-
forcement in which probabilities were reinforced directly, or cumulative payoffs
Ž . Ž .normalized, were used by Bush and Mosteller 1955 , Cross 1983 , and Arthur
Ž . Ž .1991 . Harley 1981 posited a reinforcement model using cumulative payoffs
and simulated its behavior in several games. The Harley model was later
Ž .extended by Roth and Erev 1995 to include spillover of reinforcement to
neighboring strategies. Their model fits the time trends in ultimatum, public
good, and responder-competition games but converges much too slowly. McAl-
Ž .lister 1991 shows that a modified Cross model that uses foregone payoff
Ž .information fits weak-link data modestly well. Sarin and Vahid 1997 show that
a modified Cross model with distance-weighted spillover of reinforcement to
similar strategies fits data on coordination experiments with low information
fairly well.
These studies of belief and reinforcement learning find that each approach,
evaluated separately, has some explanatory power. Other studies compared
18 Ž .models. Erev and Roth 1997 add an adjustable reference point to their
Ž Ž ..earlier model cf. Cross 1983 . The extended model fits slightly better than
fictitious play, at the individual level, in constant-sum games played for 100 or
18 ŽIn still another approach, models in which players learn to shift weight across various rules or
. Ž . Ž .‘methods’ , rather than across strategies, were studied by Tang 1996 and by Stahl 1996, 1997 . In
Ž .Tang’s comparison ‘method-learning’ does slightly worse than reinforcement. Stahl 1997 finds that
players seem to weight rules that mimic choices of others or best-respond given diffuse priors.
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Ž . Ž .more periods. Mookerjhee and Sopher 1994, 1997 MS compare average-pay-
off reinforcement and fictitious play in constant-sum games; reinforcement does
Ž .somewhat better. Ho and Weigelt 1996 compare modified versions of fictitious
Ž .play and choice reinforcement the MS ‘vindication’ model in coordination
games with multiple Nash equilibria. Fictitious play fits better. Battalio, Samuel-
Ž .son, and Van Huyck 1997 compare average-payoff reinforcement and fictitious
play in three variants of stag hunt with the same equilibria but different
disequilibrium incentives to converge. Fictitious play does better but a model
that uses both reinforcements and expected payoffs does better still.
ŽMany variants of weighted fictitious play and reinforcement and other
. Ž .models were compared by Tang 1996 in games with mixed-strategy equilibria.
Ž .Reinforcement does better in most games. Chen and Tang 1998 fit models to
data from two public goods games. In one game equilibration is so fast that
Nash equilibrium outpredicts the learning models. In the other game reinforce-
ment does better.
The overall picture from previous research is somewhat blurry. Comparisons
appear to favor reinforcement in constant-sum games and belief learning in
coordination games. However, specifications of the models and estimation
techniques vary across studies. Our approach allows one to compare models
more systematically by including all features that have been used differently in
different studies. Two general features are especially notable.
First, most papers assume equal initial attractions or, for belief models,
uniform priors. Some papers estimate initial attractions using data from early
Ž .periods which does not generally optimize overall fit . Our procedure is more
general because we estimate initial attractions and experience weight as part of
Ž .an overall maximization of fit. Estimating initial experience weight N 0 allows
belief models to express a prior strength. This is an important feature of belief
learning; omitting it may explain why belief models have sometimes fit relatively
Ž Ž . Ž . Ž .poorly in Mookerjhee and Sopher 1997 , Tang 1996 , Erev and Roth 1997 ,
Ž ..Chen and Tang 1998 .
Second, some reinforcement models assume averaged payoffs affect choices,
while others assume reinforcements cumulate. This difference can be captured
Ž . Žby allowing  to vary between  for averaging and 0 for maximum cumula-
.tion , as EWA does. In addition, many studies of belief learning did not allow
weighted fictitious play, as EWA does. Including  and  therefore allows us to
determine whether previous mixed results depend on whether reinforcements
are averaged or cumulated, and on whether belief models are weighted.
Our methodology for model estimation is more general than most earlier
papers in four ways. First, we compare across three classes of games using the
Ž Ž .same estimation technique only Cheung and Friedman 1997 have done this in
.one paper . Second, our method uses standard statistical tests to judge whether
differences in fit are due to chance, or put differently, to decide whether simple
models are too simple or not. Third, we calibrate models on the first 70% of the
periods in each sample and predict the rest of the sample to validate the
Ž .estimates and avoid overfitting no previous paper has done this . Fourth, we
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allow heterogeneity across individuals by comparing a model with a single class
of agents with a two-segment model, which has not been done before.19
5. PARAMETER ESTIMATION FROM EXPERIMENTAL DATA
5.1. Estimation Strategy
We estimated the values of model parameters using three samples of experi-
mental data20 and validated the models by predicting behavior out of sample.
ŽThe games are: Constant-sum games with unique mixed-strategy equilibria and
.one weakly dominated strategy ; a ‘median-action’ coordination with multiple
Pareto-ranked equilibria; and a dominance-solvable ‘p-beauty contest’ game
with a unique equilibrium. We chose these games for several reasons.
ŽFirst, the games have a range of different structural features as in Cheung
Ž . Ž ..and Friedman 1997 and Stahl 1997 . This avoids the possible mistake of
concluding that a model generally fits well because it happens to fit one class of
games.
Second, the games have different spansthe constant-sum games last 40
periods and the others last 10 periods. Longer spans provide more data and
more power for estimating individual differences. But a mixture of long and
short spans are valuable too, because some gameslike the coordination games
converge quickly. Learning models should be able to explain why convergence
is quick in those games and slow in others.
Third, most previous studies have reported results that are favorable to either
reinforcement or belief learning. The games we use each present some new
challenges to these models. The presence of dominated strategies in the con-
stant-sum games is a challenge for belief models, which predict those strategies
will be played relatively rarely. Rapid convergence in the coordination and
Ždominance-solvable games is a challenge for reinforcement learning see also
Ž ..Van Huyck, Battalio, and Rankin 1996 , which tends to be sluggish.
Next we describe some general features of the estimation method. For
simplicity we assume that players’ strategies are the stage-game strategies, and
Ž . Ždenote player i’s strategy choice in period t by s t . Of course, in generali
19 The only paper that estimates individual-level parameters on these kinds of models is Cheung
Ž .and Friedman 1997 . While the median parameter estimates are reasonable and similar across
Žgames when expected to be, the individual-level estimates are variable e.g., a third of the 
.estimates are negative and a sixth are above one . This reflects some imprecision in individual-level
estimation that suggests that multiple-segment estimation, which lies between single-segment
estimation and individual-level estimation, may be a reasonably parsimonious compromise between
the desires to allow heterogeneity and to estimate reliably.
20Our working paper includes two other samples of data, on weak-link coordination games and
Ž Ž ..matching pennies Mookerjhee and Sopher 1994 . We dropped these because the weak-link data
did not have a long enough span to permit both calibration and validation; calibration is reported in
Ž .Camerer and Ho 1999 . The matching pennies data did not distinguish models from each other or
from Nash equilibrium.
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strategies could be history-dependent or could be decision rules; we say more
.about this in the conclusion.
We use a ‘latent class’ approach in which there are one or two segments of
players, and all players in a segment are assumed to have the same parameter
Žvalues. This technique is standard in some fields e.g., analyses of brand choice
. Ž . 21in marketing and was also suggested by Crawford 1995 . The single-class
estimation provides a representative-agent benchmark. Allowing a second class
gives a clue about how important it is to allow heterogeneity. While allowing
heterogeneity should obviously improve fit in most cases, it does not always. For
example, in constant-sum games, allowing a second class hardly improves the fit
at all.
The two-class procedure makes sense for these data sets because there are
not enough observations per subject to reliably estimate many more classes.22
And while including more segments would be desirable, there is no reason to
think that assuming all players have the same parameters favors some models
over others, so this simplification should not alter our conclusions about which
models fit better.
jŽ . Ž .Estimating initial attractions A 0 suppressing the player subscript , as we
Ždo, has three advantages. First, assuming initial attractions are equal or
.assuming equal priors in belief models saves degrees of freedom but fits poorly
in some of these data sets. Second, estimating initial attractions creates raw
material that may be useful for constructing a good theory of first-period play; in
a sense, any such theory is trying to predict the values that we estimate. Third,
forcing a model to maximize fit by estimating learning parameters and initial
attractions at the same time allows the possibility that the model will misspecify
the initial attractions ‘on purpose’. That is, if a model cannot easily explain how
players move away from initial behavior as they learn, it will misestimate the
initial behavior. Therefore, estimating the initial attractions and comparing
them with first-period play serves as an indirect test for gross specification error.
For example, we see below that reinforcement models fail this test for coordina-
tion games.
Let the stage game be repeated for T rounds. Recall that the indicator
Ž j Ž .. j Ž .function I s , s t is equal to 1 if s s t and 0 otherwise. Define the vectori i i i
def 1 2 miŽ . Ž Ž . Ž . Ž ..of initial attractions for player i to be A 0  A 0 , A 0 , . . . , A 0 . Sincei i i i
we study symmetric games and assume all players have the same parameter
Ž . Ž .values, for this paper there is a common set of initial attractions A 0 A 0i

 i. Define the number of subjects by N. The overall sample size for calibration,
21 Note that even though all agents in a class have the same parameter values, after the first
period they will be predicted to behave differently because their actual choices and experiences vary.
22 Two segments are also useful because one can then compare a two-segment EWA model with a
two-segment model in which one segment consists of reinforcement learners and the other segment
contains belief learners, to see whether EWA is fitting better than a ‘population mixture’ of belief
Ž .and reinforcement learning. We did this in Camerer and Ho 1998 for weak-link and median-action
data and found that EWA does fit much better than the mixture model.
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Ž Ž . Ž ..7T N, is denoted by M. Then the log-likelihood function, LL A 0 , N 0 ,
., ,  , 	 , is
Ž . Ž Ž . Ž . .5.1 LL A 0 , N 0 , ,  ,  , 	
m0.7T N i
j jŽ Ž .. Ž . ln I s , s t P tÝ Ý Ý i i iž /
t1 i1 j1
m j	A Ž t1.0.7T N ii e
jŽ . Ž Ž ..5.2  ln I s , s t  .Ý Ý Ý ki i m 	A Ž t1.i iž /Ý et1 i1 j1 k1
Keep in mind that in the exponential form, attractions are only identified up
jŽ .to a constant, so we must fix one of the A 0 to equal a constant. We searched
over parameter values to maximize the LL function using the MAXLIK routine
in GAUSS, which uses a gradient method. To avoid converging to local optima
we tried a variety of starting points. We restricted , 	 to be positive, 0	 ,	1.
Generally, violations of these restrictions should be interpreted as either signs
of misspecification, or evidence that the model is trying to reach outside
reasonable parameter values to explain an unusual feature of data. Fortunately,
ˆthere are only two cases where the EWA restrictions bind0 in constant-
sum game G1, which we can’t easily explain, and0 in coordination games,ˆ
which we can explain.23
Ž .In order to make the value of N 0 interpretable as a weight on initial
jŽ .attractions relative to reinforcing payoffs, we restricted the range of A 0 to be
less than or equal to the difference between the minimum and maximum payoffs
Žin the entire game while also setting one of the attractions equal to zero for
. 24identifiability . Since this restriction is naturally satisfied in belief models, in
order to compare EWA to belief and reinforcement learning we imposed it in
25 Ž . Ž .EWA and reinforcement as well. We also restricted 0	N 0 	1 1 to
Ž .guarantee that the weights N t rise over time.
23 In the coordination games convergence is very sharp after substantial initial dispersion. To
explain this in the logit model, EWA needs attractions to grow apart as rapidly as possible, so high
Ž .attraction strategies are chosen very frequently and more frequently than in early periods . Since
Ž .the denominator of the attraction equation is N t1 1, attractions grow faster if this
denominator shrinks, which means a negative value of  can make growth even faster. Therefore,
the restricted estimate 0 in the coordination games means the model is trying to make ˆ
negative to capture the remarkable pace of equilibration seen in those data.
24 Ž .If the attractions are not restricted in this way, then the experience weight N 0 expresses both
the relative weight on initial attractions and payoffs, and a scaling factor which puts attractions and
payoffs on the same scale. By restricting attractions to have the same range as payoffs, we can then
Ž .interpret N 0 as a relative weight.
25 In our working paper we allowed initial attractions to have arbitrary scale, which made MLE
convergence slower and identification worse. Allowing arbitrary attractions helps reinforcement a bit
in constant-sum games but does not help much in median-action and beauty-contest games.
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Standard errors of parameters were estimated using a jackknife procedure. In
each run of the jackknife, one subject was excluded from the analysis and the
model was estimated using all remaining subjects.26 Doing this sequentially
Ž .produces N vectors of estimates where N is the number of subjects . The
parameter standard errors are then the standard deviations of parameter
Žestimates across the N runs. Correlations between parameters can also be
.computed this way, and help detect identification problems.
Since EWA is always more general than the special cases, it will necessarily fit
the data better so there is some danger of overfitting. To guard against this we
use five ways to penalize theories that have more degrees of freedom. We
calibrate the models by deriving MLE estimates using the first 70% of the
observations in each sample, and measure goodness of fit three ways. Then we
validate the models by using the derived estimates to predict the path of play in
the remaining 30% of the sample and measure fit two ways. This procedure uses
enough data to estimate parameters reliably, but also forecasts out-of-sample to
ensure models are not being overfit.
Obviously, deriving estimates on one part of the sample and predicting the
rest of the sample implicitly assumes stationarity in parameters throughout the
sample. In games that converge within an experiment, it is an open question how
much power out-of-sample forecasting has to distinguish theories when behavior
in the later, holdout-sample periods does not vary much. As is shown below for
coordination games, the power can be substantial. The reason is that some
theories do predict a lot of variation in later periods. If there is little variation
in the holdout sample, the absence of variation counts against a theory that
predicts variation. Also, we use the first 70% of the periods in an experimental
session to calibrate parameter estimates and the final 30% of the periods to
Ž .validate forecast . A different approach is to derive estimates for some fraction
Ž .of the subjects using their entire samples , and use those estimates to forecast
behavior for a holdout sample of subjects across the entire experimental session.
Future work could use that method and compare the results to ours.
To evaluate model accuracy in the calibration phase, the three criteria we
Ž 2report are: Log likelihoods these are used in  tests, which effectively
.penalize for EWA , and Akaike and Bayesian information criteria, which
penalize theories according to the number of free parameters in different
ways.27 We also report a pseudo-R2, denoted  2, based on the Akaike measure,
so one can see how much better the models do than random choice.28 For the
validation sample we report the log likelihood and a mean squared deviation
26 ŽFor the constant-sum games, with only twenty subjects per game ten row players and ten
.column players , every pair of row and column players were excluded, giving 100 jackknife runs.
27 Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .The Akaike criterion AIC is LLk and the Bayesian criterion BIC is LL k2  log M
where k is the number of degrees of freedom and M is the size of the calibration sample.
28 The measure  2 is the difference between the Akaike measure and the log likelihood of a
model of random choices, normalized by the random-model log likelihood.
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Ž .MSD , which is defined as
2m j jT N i Ž . Ž Ž ..P t I s , s ti i iŽ .5.3 MSD .Ý Ý Ý .3T N mit .7T1 i1 j1
Ž .Note that this MSD does not average observations across individuals. Model
fits are also compared to a random choice model in which all strategies are
chosen equally often in each period.29
Since out-of-sample forecasting is a tougher test than in-sample fitting, and
levels the playing field among theories with different numbers of parameters,
why report in-sample fits at all? One reason is that both measures of fit are
needed to judge whether a model does much better in-sample than out-of-sam-
ple, which is the telltale sign of egregious over-fitting. Furthermore, most
previous studies have relied solely on in-sample fits for comparing models.
Reporting them allows readers familiar with such comparisons to weigh the
results against their own standards.
For each game, we describe the game and basic details of how the experi-
ments were conducted. Then we compare models and discuss parameter esti-
mates.
Table I previews and summarizes the results. Within each game and measure,
other than LL and  2, the best fit statistic is printed in italics and marked with
an asterisk. In both the calibration and validation phases, EWA fits substantially
Žbetter in four of six games; in two cases the belief models fit a little better. If
EWA was overfitting, it would do relatively better in calibration than in
.validation, but this isn’t the case. Belief models do better than reinforcement in
constant-sum games and worse in the median-action game. In the beauty contest
game, the belief model does worse than reinforcement during calibration and
better during validation. The two-segment models generally fit a little better
during both validation and calibration, but the improvement in fit over one-seg-
ment models is small.
5.2. Constant-sum Games with Dominated Actions
Ž .We fit data from four constant-sum games: two are 44 G1 and G3 and the
Ž . Ž .others are 66 G2 and G4 from Mookherjee and Sopher 1997 . Tables IIab
show the payoff matrices.30 The 44 games essentially collapse three of the
Ž .undominated actions actions 35 of the 66 games into a single action
Ž .action 3 .
29 We do not compare results with Nash equilibrium, as many studies do, because it does very
Žpoorly in constant sum games and beauty-contest games in which iteratively-dominated strategies
.predicted to have zero probability are often played and does not exclude any choices in the
coordination games.
30 Ž .The fractional payoffs e.g., 23W , denote probabilistic chances of winning W. These present a
Žcomplication for reinforcement models, including EWAdo you reinforce the actual payoff which
.has a one-third chance of being zero if 23W is the payoff or the expected payoff? We reinforce
according to the expected payoff.
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TABLE I
MODEL CALIBRATION AND VALIDATION IN MEDIAN-ACTION, CONSTANT-SUM,
AND P-BEAUTY CONTEST GAMES
Calibration Validation
Game No. of
2Model Parameters LL AIC BIC  LL MSD
( )Constant-sum 1 M560
1-Segment
Random 0 803.69 803.69 803.69 0.0000 332.71 0.1875
Choice Reinforcement 5 681.97 686.97 697.96 0.1452 335.50 0.1888
Belief-based 6 680.23 686.23 699.42 0.1461 285.60* 0.1688*
EWA 8 653.07 661.07* 678.66* 0.1775 326.38 0.1883
2-Segment
Random 0 803.69 803.69 803.69 0.0000 332.71 0.1875
Choice Reinforcement 11 681.69 692.69 716.87 0.1381 328.71 0.1905
Belief-based 13 680.12 693.12 721.70 0.1376 285.96 0.1689
EWA 17 652.46 669.46 706.83 0.1670 317.66 0.1865
( )Constant-sum 2 M560
1-Segment
Random 0 1003.39 1003.39 1003.39 0.0000 430.02 0.1435
Choice Reinforcement 7 853.61 860.61 876.00 0.1423 359.74 0.1222
Belief-based 8 797.72 805.72 823.31 0.1970 350.09 0.1212
EWA 10 790.61 800.61 822.59* 0.2021 341.71 0.1179*
2-Segment
Random 0 1003.39 1003.39 1003.39 0.0000 430.02 0.1435
Choice Reinforcement 15 853.50 868.50 901.48 0.1344 363.10 0.1513
Belief-based 17 790.10 807.10 844.47 0.1956 347.50 0.1205
EWA 21 776.83 797.83* 844.00 0.2049 335.95* 0.1195
( )Constant-sum 3 M560
1-Segment
Random 0 803.69 803.69 803.69 0.0000 332.71 0.1875
Choice Reinforcement 5 710.14 715.14 726.13 0.1102 308.47 0.1801
Belief-based 6 681.63 687.63 700.82* 0.1444 296.28 0.1728
EWA 8 678.50 686.50* 704.09 0.1458 301.70 0.1767
2-Segment
Random 0 803.69 803.69 803.69 0.0000 332.71 0.1875
Choice Reinforcement 11 710.14 721.14 745.32 0.1027 308.30 0.1800
Belief-based 13 681.07 694.07 722.65 0.1364 295.85* 0.1722
EWA 17 677.60 694.60 731.97 0.1357 302.88 0.1712*
( )Constant-sum 4 M560
1-Segment
Random 0 1003.39 1003.39 1003.39 0.0000 430.02 0.1435
Choice Reinforcement 7 901.60 908.60 923.99 0.0945 375.94 0.1284
Belief-based 8 857.19 865.19* 882.78* 0.1377 371.18 0.1262
EWA 10 855.29 865.29 887.27 0.1376 362.26 0.1241
2-Segment
Random 0 1003.39 1003.39 1003.39 0.0000 430.02 0.1435
Choice Reinforcement 15 901.60 916.60 949.58 0.0865 375.62 0.1283
Belief-based 17 856.97 873.97 911.34 0.1290 372.12 0.1265
EWA 21 854.00 875.00 921.17 0.1280 361.15* 0.1239*
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TABLE I
Continued
Calibration Validation
Game No. of
2Model Parameters LL AIC BIC  LL MSD
( )Median Action M378
1-Segment
Random Choice 0 677.29 677.29 677.29 0.0000 315.24 0.1217
Choice Reinforcement 8 341.70 349.70 365.44 0.4837 80.27 0.0301
Belief-based 9 438.74 447.74 465.45 0.3389 113.90 0.0519
EWA 11 309.30 320.30 341.94* 0.5271 41.05 0.0185
2-Segment
Random 0 677.29 677.29 677.29 0.0000 315.24 0.1217
Choice Reinforcement 17 331.25 348.25 381.70 0.4858 66.32 0.0245
Belief-based 19 379.24 398.24 435.62 0.4120 70.31 0.0250
EWA 23 290.25 313.25* 358.51 0.5375 34.79* 0.0139*
( )p-beauty contests M1372
1-Segment
Random 0 6318.296318.29 6318.29 0.00002707.84 0.0099
Choice Reinforcement 12 5910.995922.99 5954.33 0.06262594.37 0.0101
Belief-based 13 6083.046096.04 6129.99 0.03522554.21 0.0097
EWA 15 5878.205893.20 5932.38 0.06732381.28 0.0098
2-Segment
Random 0 6318.296318.29 6318.29 0.00002707.84 0.0099
Choice Reinforcement 25 5910.985935.98 6001.28 0.06052594.17 0.0101
Belief-based 27 6083.026110.02 6180.54 0.03302554.11 0.0097*
EWA 31 5771.465802.46*5883.43* 0.08162355.00* 0.0098
ŽNote that these games each have a weakly dominated action action 4 in G1
.and G3 and 6 in G2 and G4 . Dominated actions are useful for model
discrimination because belief-based models always predict these actions will be
Ž .chosen weakly less frequently than dominant actions, whereas the arbitrary
initial attractions allowed by EWA and choice reinforcement can allow frequent
choices of dominated strategies.
All these games have a unique mixed strategy equilibrium that is symmetric
Ž .even though the games are not symmetric . In games G1 and G3, in equilibrium
actions 14 are played with probabilities 38, 28, 38, 0 respectively. In games
G2 and G4, equilibrium proportions are 38, 28, 18, 18, 18, 0 for actions
16.
Each game was played by 10 different pairs of subjects playing with the same
partner 40 times. At the end of each period players were told their partner’s
choice and their own payoff. In games G1 and G2 a win paid 5 rupees; in games
ŽG3 and G4 the payoffs were doubled to 10 rupees. A typical student’s monthly
.room and board cost 600 rupees.
We derived MLE parameter estimates using the first 28 periods, and validated
by predicting the last 12 periods. Because the payoff matrix is not symmetric
Ž .even though the equilibrium mixed-strategy proportions are , we estimate
jŽ . jŽ .separate initial attractions A 0 and separate initial experience-weights N 0i i
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TABLE IIa
Ž .44 CONSTANT SUM GAMES, G1 W5 RUPEES ;
Ž .AND G3 W10 RUPEES
Column
S1 S2 S3 S4
S1 W, L L, W L, W W, L
S2 L, W L, W W, L W, L
Row
S3 L, W W, L 13W, 23W 13W, 23W
S4 L, W L, W 23W, 13W W, L
TABLE IIb
Ž . Ž .66 CONSTANT-SUM GAMES, G2 W5 RUPEES AND G4 W10 RUPEES
Column
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6
S1 W,L L,W L,W L,W L,W W,L
S2 L,W L,W W,L W,L W,L W,L
S3 L,W W,L L,W L,W W,L L,W
Row
S4 L,W W,L W,L L,W L,W L,W
S5 L,W W,L L,W W,L L,W W,L
S6 L,W L,W W,L L,W W,L W,L
Ž Ž .for row and column players though we restrict the total experience weight N 0
.to be the same for both types of players . Tables IIIab show the MLE
parameter estimates of the models, and  2 tests of the belief and reinforcement
Ž .restrictions along with p-values and degrees of freedom . We report only the
one-segment results because the two-segment results do not improve much and
offer no special insights.
Tables IIIab shows that for one-segment models, belief-based models and
choice reinforcement restrictions are weakly and strongly rejected by  2 tests,
respectively, in the calibration phase. In the validation phase, the reinforcement
model is worst. The belief model is better than EWA in the four-strategy games
G1 and G3, and worse in the six-strategy games G2 and G4. These differences
are not large, however, and seem to be due to an idiosyncracy in game G1.31
Tables IIIab report parameter estimates and jackknifed standard errors. The
ˆjŽ .initial conditions A 0 are encouragingly similar in pairs of low- and high-stakes
Ž .games G1G3 and G2G4 , and put low initial attraction on the dominated
31 In game G1, EWA overfits the first 28 periods because it detects some upward trend in
strategies S1 and S3, and downward trend in S2. These trends are reversed in the last 12 periods so
EWA predicts poorly there. The belief model estimates differences in initial expected payoffs but
Žˆ .has a huge value of N 0 300, so it doesn’t predict much movement at all.
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TABLE IIIa
Ž . Ž .44 CONSTANT-SUM GAMES G1 AND G3 M560
Choice
EWA Reinforcement Belief-Based Models
Parameters G1 G3 G1 G3 G1 G3
Initial Values
ROW
1 1Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 1.320 5.237 0.000 10.000 1.780 107.370 3.914 22.703
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.059 0.222 0.012 0.000 0.029 1.758 0.073 0.423
2 2Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 1.145 1.172 0.000 0.000 1.422 107.290 1.739 25.214
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.092 0.265 0.000 0.000 0.070 4.687 0.290 1.403
3 3Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 1.913 7.187 5.000 10.000 2.262 85.335 4.927 10.084
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.066 0.300 0.000 0.000 0.057 4.187 0.149 1.682
4 4Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.948 0.000 1.159 0.000
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.193 0.000
COLUMN
1 1Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 2.681 6.790 5.000 10.000 3.385 96.887 6.674 19.294
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.091 0.640 0.000 0.000 0.049 2.923 0.092 0.536
2 2Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 2.583 6.859 5.000 10.000 3.079 87.932 6.423 17.962
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.102 0.580 0.000 0.000 0.043 2.582 0.089 0.935
3 3Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 2.345 5.359 5.000 8.408 2.896 115.280 5.711 20.744
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.092 0.735 0.000 0.000 0.040 2.563 0.136 0.514
4 4Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.281 0.001 2.384 0.000
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.059 0.000
Ž .N 0 19.630 18.391 1.000 1.000 300.000 58.000
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .    0.065 0.713 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Decay Parameters
 1.040 1.005 1.012 0.978 1.000 1.000
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .0.010 0.009 0.006 0.008 0.001 0.005
 0.961 0.946 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .0.014 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005
Imagination factor
 0.000 0.730 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .0.035 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Payoff sensitivity
	 0.508 0.182 0.053 0.033 1.168 0.459
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .0.048 0.015 0.004 0.002 0.067 0.063
Log-likelihood
LL 653.072 678.496 681.968 710.136 680.232 681.632
2   57.792 63.280 54.320 5.328
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .p-value, dof 0.000, 3 0.000, 3 0.000, 2 0.067, 2
Žˆ .strategies. The initial experience weight N 0 varies between about 1020 and is
Ž .close to its steady-state value of 1 1 . This means that initial attractions
are weighted quite heavily, which is reasonable given the slow convergence in
ˆthese 40-period games. The decay parameters  and  are close to one, withˆ
ˆ. These numbers imply that attractions grow only slightly on average. Byˆ
forcing 0, in contrast, the reinforcement model forces attractions to grow
ˆand ‘locks in’ initial behavior too quickly. Finally,  is between .4 and .7 and
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TABLE IIIb
Ž . Ž .66 CONSTANT-SUM GAMES G2 AND G4 M560
Choice
EWA Reinforcement Belief-Based Models
Parameters G2 G4 G2 G4 G2 G4
Initial Values
ROW
1 1Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 2.996 9.491 5.000 10.000 2.309 41.566 5.335 16.005
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.068 0.145 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.810 0.053 0.283
2 2Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 2.434 7.964 5.000 10.000 2.077 11.048 4.665 0.001
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.043 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.886 0.053 0.000
3 3Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.000 1.122 10.227 0.734 1.090
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.015 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.086 1.111 0.050 0.083
4 4Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 1.182 18.018 0.364 10.704
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.036 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.080 0.850 0.026 0.298
5 5Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 1.338 6.105 0.229 8.501 1.615 9.141 3.568 2.200
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.034 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.993 0.071 0.115
6 6Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.076 0.000 0.097 0.000
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.040 0.000
COLUMN
1 1Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 4.998 8.733 5.000 10.000 3.595 25.296 7.769 6.692
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.020 0.198 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.797 0.072 0.253
2 2Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 4.047 6.306 4.852 9.996 3.218 32.627 6.383 10.301
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.046 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.034 1.151 0.131 0.496
3 3Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 2.201 1.572 0.001 0.001 2.444 16.539 3.954 5.141
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.050 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.922 0.102 0.352
4 4Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 3.852 6.565 4.973 9.832 3.068 13.391 6.557 5.684
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.043 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.053 0.914 0.150 0.462
5 5Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 1.737 1.851 0.000 0.001 2.269 2.147 4.135 0.028
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.047 0.267 0.000 0.000 0.085 0.389 0.213 0.000
6 6Ž .  Ž .    A 0 N 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.663 0.000 3.608 2.155
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .   Ž .  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.131 0.373
Ž .N 0 15.276 9.937 1.000 1.000 90.000 30.000
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .0.009 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.448
Decay Parameters
 0.986 0.991 0.960 0.962 0.989 1.000
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .0.005 0.011 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.002
 0.935 0.926 0.000 0.000 0.989 1.000
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .0.006 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.002
Imagination factor
 0.413 0.547 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .0.082 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Payoff sensitivity
	 0.646 0.218 0.098 0.046 1.812 1.501
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .0.030 0.019 0.005 0.002 0.123 0.019
LL 790.608 855.288 853.608 901.600 797.720 842.968
2   126.000 92.264 14.224 21.280
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .p-value, dof 0.000,3 0.000,3 0.001,2 0.000,2
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significantly different from both zero and one, except in game G1 where it is
estimated to be zero.
Notice how the EWA estimates reflect a hybridization of elements of rein-
forcement and belief learning. First, the initial EWA attractions place much less
Žrelative weight on the dominated strategies the highest-numbered strategies 4
.or 6 than the corresponding expected payoffs in belief models. In the belief
Žmodel the gap between the initial expected payoffs of strategy 2 the dominant
.strategies and the dominated strategies cannot be too large because the
strategies are only weakly dominated. For example, in game G1 the estimated
EWA attractions on row strategies 2 and 4 are 1.14 and .00, while the corre-
sponding estimated expected payoffs are 1.42 and .95, a gap less than half as
large. Thus, EWA exploits the flexibility of initial attractions from reinforcement
models to squash the likelihood of playing weakly dominated strategies further
down than belief models can. Second, EWA borrows the belief-model property
ˆthat attractions do not grow much, since  and  are very close. Third, theˆ
Ž .estimates of  around .5 except G1 reflect both the law of simulated effect
Ž . Ž .0 and stronger effects of actual payoffs than foregone payoffs 1 .
Our conclusions about the relative performance of reinforcement and belief
Ž .models are different from the findings of Mookerjhee and Sopher 1997 . Their
analysis differed in a couple of important ways.32 They allowed cross-effects so
jŽ .that the attraction A t can affect the probability of playing other strategiesi
differentially, which is more general than our approach and seems to favor
reinforcement in their estimation. Their version of reinforcement also used
Ž .‘a
erage achieved earnings’ rather than weighted cumulative earnings. The fact
ˆthat  was very close to  in the EWA estimates indicates that MS took theˆ
right tack by using average earnings rather than cumulative earnings, because
the cumulative-earnings assumption predicts a sharpness of convergence that is
Žnot evident in the data. In addition, their version of the belief model which uses
.time-averaged expected payoffs does not begin with an initial pre-game experi-
Ž .ence count expressing prior beliefs. Our estimates of N 0 range from 30 to 300,
which means that the belief model does best when it starts with a strong prior
and updates very little. Thus, the difference between our results and theirs is
either due to their use of cross-effects of attractions on other-strategy probabili-
ties, to the fact that they use averaged reinforcements rather than cumulative
Ž .ones which improves reinforcement relative to our method , or to the fact that
Žthey did not allow strong prior beliefs which handicaps the belief model relative
.to our method .
Finally, notice that these constant-sum games simply do not distinguish
Ž Ž ..models empirically very well as shown also by Erev and Roth 1997 , and the
32 Their analysis used logit estimation of strategy choices to judge whether choices depended
Ž .more strongly on a player’s own average past earnings a kind of choice reinforcement or on
Ž .expected earnings based on opponent’s past history fictitious play . They also compared models
based on the entire previous history, weighting all observations equally, with models based on a
Ž .five-period moving average. The entire-history models fit better.
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TABLE IV
THE MEDIAN EFFORT GAME
 4Median Xi
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 1.30 1.15 0.90 0.55 0.10 0.45 1.10
6 1.25 1.20 1.05 0.80 0.45 0.00 0.55
5 1.10 1.15 1.10 0.95 0.70 0.35 0.10
Xi 4 0.85 1.00 1.05 1.00 0.85 0.60 0.25
3 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95 0.90 0.75 0.50
2 0.05 0.40 0.65 0.80 0.85 0.80 0.65
1 0.50 0.05 0.30 0.55 0.70 0.75 0.70
pseudo-R2 ’s are low. Coordination games, in which players converge quickly,
may prove to be a better domain in which to distinguish theories.
5.3. Median-action Games
In median-action order-statistic coordination games, the group payoff de-
pends on the median of all players’ actions.33 Table IV shows the payoff matrix
Ž Ž ..used by Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil VHBB 1990 , whose data we use.
Players earn a payoff that increases in the median, and decreases in the
Ž .squared deviation from the median. The median-action games capture social
situations in which conformity pressures induce people to behave like others do,
but everyone prefers the group to choose a high median.
We estimate EWA, choice reinforcement, and belief models using sessions
Ž .16 from VHBB game  . In their experiments groups of nine subjects each
play ten periods together, so the sample has 54 subjects.34 In each round players
choose an integer from 1 to 7, inclusive. At the end of each round the median is
Ž .announced but not the full distribution of choices and players compute their
Žpayoffs. Since the groups are large and players do not know what the median
.would be if their own choice was different , we assume that players form beliefs
over the median of all players, ignoring their own influence on the median and
treating the group as a composite single player.
Figure 1a shows the actual frequencies across the six sessions, pooled to-
gether. Initial choices are concentrated around 45, with a dip at 6 and small
spikes at 3 and 7. Later choices move sharply toward the initial medians, which
were always 4 or 5. A striking feature, which is masked by pooling sessions, is
that the 10th-round median in e
ery session was equal to the first-round median.
33 Ž .Camerer and Ho 1999 also report estimates from ’weak-link’ coordination games in which the
group payoff depends on the minimum. The parameter estimates are similar to those reported here
Ž .for example  is .65 and N 0 is around two.ˆ
34 Ž .They compared two treatments using nine-person groups and ‘dual market’ dm treatments in
which players play with a nine-person group and a twenty-seven person group simultaneously. There
is no apparent or statistically-significant difference between these treatments so we pool them
together.
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FIGURE 1A.Actual frequencies, median-effort games.
In three sessions the median began at 4 and stayed there; in the other three
sessions the median began at 5 and stayed there. Figure 1a shows three key
features of the data that any learning model should account for: The initial
Ž .spikes at 45 roughly double in size as players converge fully toward them ;
disequilibrium choices of 3 and 7 are quickly extinguished after the first period;
Žand there is a ‘‘dip’’ in initial choices at 6 fewer players choose 6 than choose
.neighboring strategies 5 or 7 .
From a learning point of view, median-action games are interesting because
the penalty for deviating is fairly small if the players are close to equilibrium.
Yet sharp convergence occurs within a couple of periods. Learning models that
assume choices are reinforced must explain why players move quickly to equilib-
rium despite the large reinforcement if they are close to equilibrium and the
small extra gain from moving precisely to equilibrium. The EWA model can
account for this swift convergence if  is close to one, incorporating the
best-responsiveness inherent in belief learning.
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FIGURE 1B.Predictive errors of EWA model.
Table V shows estimation results for the median-action games. First we focus
Ž 2on one-segment results. EWA fits better than the reinforcement model  
. Ž 2 .64.8 and much better than the belief model  258.9 . The sources of
EWA’s improved fit are evident from looking at the data and plots of prediction
errors.
Figure 1a shows that in the actual data, there are two large spikes in initial
Ž .choices at 45, smaller spikes about 15% of the observations at 3 and 7, and
few observations at 6. The estimated EWA initial attractions basically reflect
this pattern in the data. The accuracy of the reflection can be judged from
Ž .Figure 1b, an EWA error plot. This figure shows the difference between MLE
predicted frequencies of the EWA model and the actual frequencies. The
largest error is that EWA underpredicts the frequency of choices of 3 by about
.06; predictions of 6 and 7 are too high by .03 and .01.
Reinforcement and belief learning cannot fit the initial conditions as well as
EWA, but for different reasons. Reinforcement learning underpredicts the
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FIGURE 1C.Predictive errors of choice reinforcement model.
actual initial frequencies of 3 and 7 by about .08. Players who chose strategy 7 in
the first period quickly switch to lower numbers in period 2, as Figure 1a shows.
ŽThe same is true for players who chose strategy 3, but this cannot be seen in
.Figure 1a. Reinforcement learning cannot predict how quickly this convergence
occurs. Since the initial medians are 45, choices of 3 or 7 earn between $.55
and $.95, while ex-post best responses earn $1.00 to $1.10. Since the initial
choices are positively reinforced, reinforcement learning cannot explain why
subjects will abandon these strategies so quickly and switch in the direction of
Žthe observed median. EWA explains convergence with a high estimate of
ˆ . .85. Since choice reinforcement does not adjust chosen strategies quickly
enough, to maximize overall fit it deliberately misestimates the first-period
choices by assuming the initial frequencies are close to frequencies in later
Ž .periods, thereby underpredicting choices of 3 and 7 and overpredicting 45 .
Figure 1c shows that the belief model underpredicts 3 and 7 also, but for a
different reason. In the belief-based framework it is hard to explain why players
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FIGURE 1D.Predictive errors of belief-based model.
would play 6 less than they play 5 or 7. The problem is that initial beliefs that
Ž .give a high expected payoff to 45 expecting a median of 45 also give an
expected payoff to 6 that is nearly as large, and larger than the expected payoff
to 7. Beliefs that give a large expected payoff to 7, because there is a high
probability that the median will be 7, will also give a high expected payoff to 6.
Thus, it is difficult to find a single set of beliefs that can explain the spikes at
45 and 7, without also predicting a spike at 6. As a result, Table V shows that
the one-segment model generates initial expected payoffs that are higher for 6
Ž . Ž .$.78 than for 3 or 7 $.71 and $.60 , so it overpredicts 6 and underpredicts 3
Ž .and 7 and also overpredicts 5 .
Adding a second segment of players improves the belief-model fit dramati-
Ž 2cally. As Table V shows, the log likelihood improves a lot the  statistics for
.the two-segment results compare one- and two-segment fits within each model .
Ž .The two belief-model segments correspond naturally to a large 78% segment
with high expected payoffs for 45 generated by high initial beliefs in 45, and a
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Ž .smaller 22% segment with belief only in 7, which generates the highest
expected payoff for 7. While testing the restriction that the second segment does
Ž 2 .not improve fit rejects strongly  119.0 , the two-segment belief model still
does not fit as well as the one- or two-segment EWA model.
Finally, Table I shows that EWA performs much better than the other models
in out-of-sample validation, using either the LL or MSD measure. The error
plots show that reinforcement overpredicts the number of people choosing 6 in
periods eight and ten, because these choices are positively reinforced and should
persist; EWA does a little better by predicting that these late-period choices
move toward 45. The belief model predicts a growth in strategies 3 and 6 over
time, because the expected payoffs of those strategies will be almost as high as
the expected payoffs from strategies 45 as equilibration occurs. Since those
strategies are rarely used in later periods, the belief model badly overpredicts
them in those periods.
Besides fitting initial conditions, a good learning model must explain why
convergence in the first couple of periods is fast and sharp. EWA does this by
ˆŽ .estimating a large value of  .85 and  much larger than , which allowsˆ
attractions to grow rapidly so that choice probabilities move toward zero and
Ž .one swiftly. The low value of N 0 , .65, also allows players to learn quickly from
payoff reinforcement relative to initial attractions.
The estimates show how EWA mixes and matches the best features of belief
Ž .and reinforcement learning: It allows near-best response  close to one as in
belief models, which explains why players choosing near-equilibrium strategies
move quickly toward equilibrium. But as in reinforcement, it can allow arbitrary
initial attractions, which explains the relative paucity of choices of 6 in the first
Ž .period, and allows attractions to grow because 0 to explain the sharpness
Ž .of convergence. As a result, the EWA errors Figure 1b are generally much
Ž . Ž .smaller than those in reinforcement Figure 1c and belief learning Figure 1d .
The results shown in the error plots are for one-segment models. Adding a
second segment improves fits significantly for all three models. In EWA, the
ˆŽ .larger segment with proportion 66% has an estimate  .95, very close to the
ˆbelief restriction of one, while the smaller second segment has  .50. This
corresponds to a segment of people with belief-type equal weighting of actual
and foregone payoffs, and another segment who weight actual payoffs twice as
heavily. Notice that these two segments do not particularly correspond to one
segment of reinforcement learners and another segment of belief learners, so
EWA is not simply capturing a mixture of these two special cases.
Ž .In reinforcement, the larger segment 80% has parameter values which are
similar to those in the single segment, except the estimates of initial attractions
Ž .for 3 and 7 are zero. The smaller second segment 20% is the opposite
strategies 3 and 7 have the largest possible initial attractions and all the others
ˆ 35are close to zeroexcept that 0. This means the two-segment structure is
35 The estimate of zero for  is the full-sample MLE estimate. The jackknifed standard error of
.235 means that in many jackknife samples  is estimated to be positive. Indeed, the mean of the
jackknife estimates is .18, but this does not substantially affect the point we make in the text.
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trying to solve the problem of explaining first-period choices of 3 and 7 that are
quickly extinguished by creating a second segment of players who choose only 3
or 7 initially, then immediately decay their initial attraction. But adding this
segment does not improve log likelihood much and the two-segment reinforce-
ment model still fits worse than the one-segment EWA model.
The two-segment belief model improves fit substantially but still does not
Ž .capture initial attractions flexibly enough compared to EWA . We think the
problem is that the belief model requires initial behavior to be consistent with
prior beliefs and requires beliefs to be updated using weighted fictitious play.
The latter assumption requires 1 and . In games like the median-ac-
tion game, the 1 assumption is a reasonable approximation but  does
not allow sharp enough convergence.36 More importantly, forcing initial attrac-
tions to spring from expected payoffs does not explain behavior of players who
use certain decision rules. For example, a player who randomizes among
different selection principles will not necessarily choose according to expected
payoffs given prior.
5.4. Dominance-sol
able p-Beauty Contest Games
In a p-beauty contest game, n players simultaneously choose numbers x ini
n some interval, say 0,100 . The average of their numbers xÝ x n is com-i i
puted, which establishes a target number,  , equal to p x. The player whose
Žnumber is closest to the target wins a fixed prize n  and ties are broken
37 .randomly .
Ž .P-beauty contest games were first studied experimentally by Nagel 1995 and
Ž . Ž .extended by Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt 1998 and Duffy and Nagel in press .
These games are useful for estimating the number of steps of iterated domi-
nance players use in reasoning through games. To illustrate, suppose p .7.
Since the target can never be above 70, any number choice above 70 is
stochastically dominated by simply picking 70. Similarly, players who obey
dominance, and believe others do too, will pick numbers below 49 so choices in
Ž the interval 49,100 violate the conjunction of dominance and one step of
iterated dominance. The unique Nash equilibrium is 0.
ŽThere are two behavioral regularities in beauty contest games see Nagel
Ž . .1999 for a review . First, initial choices are widely dispersed and centered
somewhere between the interval midpoint and the equilibrium. This basic result
has been replicated with students on three continents and with several samples
of sophisticated adults, including economics Ph.D.’s and a sample of CEOs and
36 Ž .The fact that 0 in EWA and never varies across the jackknife runs also suggests thatˆ
adding more segments to the belief model will not improve fit substantially compared to EWA
models with the same number of segments, because the belief models are always constrained to have
.
37 Ž . Ž  . Ž  . Ž .Formally,  x , x n I x , argmin x  Ý I x , argmin x  where I x, y isi  i i x j i i x jj j
the indicator function that equals one if xy and 0 otherwise.
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Ž Ž ..corporate presidents see Camerer 1997 . Second, when the game is repeated,
numbers gradually converge toward the equilibrium.
Explaining beauty contest convergence is a challenge for adaptive learning
models. Standard choice reinforcement is likely to converge far too slowly,
because only one player wins each period and the losers get no reinforcement.
Belief models with low values of , which update beliefs very quickly, may track
the learning process reasonably well, but earlier work suggests Cournot dynam-
Ž Ž ..ics do not converge fast enough either Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt 1998 .
The three models were estimated on a subsample of data collected by Ho,
Ž .Camerer, and Weigelt 1998 . Subjects were 196 undergraduate students in
computer science and engineering in Singapore. Each seven-person group of
players played 10 times together twice, with different values of p in the two
Ž .10-period sequences. One sequence used p1 and is not included below. The
prize was .5 Singapore dollars per player each time, about $2.33 per group for
seven-person groups. They were publicly told the target number  and privately
Ž .told their own payoff i.e., whether they were closest or not .
We analyze a subsample of their data with p .7 and .9, from groups of size
Ž7. This subsample combines groups in a ‘high experience’ condition the game is
.the second one subjects play, following a game with a value of p1 and the
Ž .‘low experience’ condition the game is the first they play . The experience
conditions were pooled to create enough data to get reliable estimates.
Several design choices were necessary to implement the model. The subjects
 chose integers in the interval 0, 100 , a total of 101 strategies. If we allow 101
jŽ .possible values of A 0 we quickly use too many degrees of freedom estimating
the initial attractions. Rather than imposing too many structural requirements
jŽ .on the distribution of A 0 , we assumed initial attractions were equal in
    38ten-number intervals 0, 9 , 10, 19 , etc.
To implement EWA we assumed subjects knew the winning number, w
  argmin x  , and neglected the effect of their own choice on the targetx jj
number.39 Define the distance between the winning number and the target
  Žnumber as d w . All subjects reinforced numbers in the intervals d, 
.  . Ž d by  times the prize, and numbers in the intervals 0, d and d, 100
received no reinforcement. Winners reinforced the boundary number they
chose, either d or d, by the prize divided by the number of winners, and
reinforced the other boundary number by  times the prize divided by the
38 jŽ .In our working paper we assumed the distribution of the values of A 0 came from a beta
distribution but the basic results were not much different. We also tried fitting asymmetric triangular
100Ž . 50 Ž . 0Ž . jŽ .distributions, in which A 0 0, A 0 c, A 0 b, and A 0 was piecewise linear between 0
Ž .and 50, and 50 and 100, with slopes cb 50 and c50, respectively, and tried normal
distributions but the basic results were unchanged.
39 Ž .Since subjects were not told the winning number unless their number won , the fact that we
must assume they do to estimate the model could be considered a handicap for the EWA and
belief-based models, and a possible advantage for choice reinforcement, which does not require this
assumption.
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number of winners. Losers reinforced both boundary numbers d and d
by  times the prize, divided by the number of winners plus one.
Implementing the belief model is not straightforward because subjects were
told only the target number, and whether they won, so they do not have enough
information to form beliefs about what other subjects will do, and use these
updated beliefs to calculate expected payoffs. Reinforcing numbers in some
intervals, as in the EWA updating, will not necessarily correspond to belief
Žlearning based in information about all others’ numbers which they do not
.know anyway . As a result, we estimate a restricted form of EWA with belief-type
parameters by setting 1, , estimating initial belief counts in the
ten-number intervals, and taking initial expected payoffs to be normalized belief
Ž .counts multiplied by the prize. Numbers in the winning interval d, d are
reinforced by one times the prize. This corresponds to a special kind of belief
learning in which players are learning what the target number will be and
best-responding given their beliefs.
Table I reports overall results. Generally the fit is not very impressive;  2
values are only around 7%. In the calibration sample, EWA is slightly better
than reinforcement, which is better than the belief model. Out of sample, the
Žbelief model and EWA model are about equally good and reinforcement is
.clearly worst ; the belief model is slightly better on MSD and much worse in log
likelihood than EWA.
Table VI reports results of parameter estimates.
The EWA model fits the data as best it can in an odd way: It assumes there is
a general tendency to pick lower numbers, which grows stronger over time. This
can be seen in the initial attractions, which are largest for the lowest number
40 Žintervals, even though the first-period choices are clustered around 4049 i.e.,
5Ž ..attraction category A 0 . Then the model assumes these initial attractions
ˆŽ .‘inflate’ over time 1.33 . The model is not capturing learning from experi-
ence well because lagged attractions are weighted heavily compared to payoff
ˆ ˆŽ Ž . . Ž .reinforcement N 0 is 16.82 , and the estimate  is small .23 .
Choice reinforcement uses the same ingredientshigh initial attractions for
ˆ Ž .lower numbers, inflated by 1.38but fits substantially worse because N 0
Žis forced to be one and there is little reinforcement from direct payoffs since
.most players lose and get nothing . The belief model, in contrast, fits best by
 assuming initial expected payoffs are highest for choices in the interval 40, 49 ,
Ž .responding to payoff experience strongly  is fixed at one , and decaying
ˆ ˆŽ Ž . .attractions fairly quickly N 0 1.67 and  .40 .
The two-segment analysis of EWA improves calibration substantially, com-
pared to the one-segment model, and improves on the validation log-likelihood
modestly. The two-segment reinforcement and belief models add very little to
fit, especially in validation.
40  The exception is that attractions are high for the interval 90, 100 . This is to account for the
occasional outlying choices of 100, which are discussed at length in Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt
Ž .1998 .
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TABLE VI
Ž .P-BEAUTY CONTESTS M1372
Choice
Parameters EWA Reinforcement Belief-Based Models
Initial values
1 1Ž .  Ž .  A 0 N 0 3.348 3.500 0.000 0.000
Ž . Ž . Ž .  0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 2Ž .  Ž .  A 0 N 0 3.311 3.240 0.000 0.000
Ž . Ž . Ž .  0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
3 3Ž .  Ž .  A 0 N 0 3.301 3.160 0.000 0.000
Ž . Ž . Ž .  0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
4 4Ž .  Ž .  A 0 N 0 3.269 2.891 0.000 0.000
Ž . Ž . Ž .  0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
5 5Ž .  Ž .  A 0 N 0 3.227 2.442 0.350 0.167
Ž . Ž . Ž .  0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
6 6Ž .  Ž .  A 0 N 0 3.180 2.006 0.000 0.000
Ž . Ž . Ž .  0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
7 7Ž .  Ž .  A 0 N 0 3.052 0.591 0.000 0.000
Ž . Ž . Ž .  0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000
8 8Ž .  Ž .  A 0 N 0 2.912 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ž . Ž . Ž .  0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000
9 9Ž .  Ž .  A 0 N 0 2.871 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ž . Ž . Ž .  0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000
10 10Ž .  Ž .  A 0 N 0 3.060 0.700 0.000 0.000
Ž . Ž . Ž .  0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000
Ž .N 0 16.815 1.000 1.672
Ž . Ž .  0.000 0.000 0.002
Decay Parameters
 1.330 1.375 0.402
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.004 0.002 0.001
 0.941 0.000 0.402
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.000 0.000 0.001
Imagination factor
 0.232 0.000 1.000
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.013 0.000 0.000
Payoff sensitivity
	 2.579 0.223 0.942
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.002 0.002 0.001
Log-likelihood
LL 5878.197 5910.988 6083.036
2 65.582 409.679
Ž . Ž . Ž .p-value, dof  0.000,3 0.000,2
Ž .The two EWA segments that emerge not reported in Table VI are interest-
Ž .ing. The larger segment 66% is very much like the one-segment EWA
ˆestimate: Estimated initial attractions increase for smaller-number intervals, 
ˆˆ Ž .is 1.61,  is zero, and the experience weight N 0 is 16.83. The smaller segment
Ž .34% is remarkably like the one-segment belief model estimate: Initial attrac-
ˆ tions are highest for choices in the middle interval 50, 59 ,  and  are smallˆ
ˆˆŽ . Ž .and very close .50 and .43 ,  is estimated to be 1.0, and N 0 1.76.
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None of these models captures the nature of learning well. The reinforcement
and one-segment EWA models simply pretend that the first period is like later
periods and inflate initial attractions to gradually reproduce the latter-period
data. Belief models converge too slowly.
We think the results suggest two possible kinds of misspecification which we
Ž .plan to remedy in future research and have been studied by others .
One possibility is that players detect trends and so, for example, use an
Ž . Ž .extrapolative rule of the form ‘‘expect that x t1 is the same multiple of x t
Ž . Ž . Žthat x t was of x t1 .’’ Our model does not explicitly allow this since players
.are assumed to use stage-game strategies only. Such a model could be adaptive,
in the sense of using only past observations and neglecting information about
payoffs of others, but could allow subjects to choose strategies that are best
responses to behavior they have not observed before.
Another possibility is this: Since these models are adaptive, they only use
Ž .information about previous payoffs including previous foregone payoffs . Adap-
tive models of this sort cannot account for learning when players sophisticatedly
Ž Ž ..realize that other players are learning as well cf. Milgrom and Roberts 1991 .
Ž Ž .. Ž .Our earlier work Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt 1998 and Stahl 1996 showed
that a fraction of players seems to ‘iteratively best-respond’ in the sense that
Žthey choose numbers that are not best responses to observed history as in
.weighted fictitious play , but instead choose numbers that are best responses to
anticipated best-responding by others. Because the belief and reinforcement
models do not have this kind of sophistication, the hybrid EWA does not either.
Including sophistication in some parsimonious way may improve the fit.
We are agnostic about whether the extrapolative or sophisticated approach is
generally better. There are empirical reasons to pursue both: Some experiments
have shown that players behave differently when they know the payoffs of others
Ž Ž ..e.g., Partow and Schotter 1993 , indicating sophistication. Still other experi-
Ž .ments besides p-beauty contests suggest sensitivity to time trends or differ-
Ž Ž ..ences in previous results Huck, Normann, and Oechssler 1997 .
5.5. Identification of Parameters and Model Diagnostics
The results generally show that EWA fits better than either of the special
cases, both adjusting for extra parameters and predicting out of sample. A
further test for model specification is to ask whether there are regular correla-
Ž .tions among the three added parameters,  N 0 , and , and other parameters.
Because the EWA model is highly nonlinear, it is possible that certain parame-
Žters covary so closely that it is difficult to identify them econometrically. By
definition, a nonidentified parameter could be dropped from the model without
.reducing fit. It is easy to show algebraically that the parameters are identified,
in the sense that for arbitrary data sets and MLE parameter estimates, no other
set of parameter values would fit equally well. However, it is possible that
parameters are nearly nonidentified in some data sets.
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One way to check the severity of nonidentifiability is to compute correlations
among parameter estimates across jackknife runs. Two parameters that cannot
be disentangled will be perfectly correlated across runs. Low or modest correla-
tions across runs indicate that parameters have detectably separate influences.
By inspecting the intercorrelations of the three important added parameters we
can check whether each parameter contributes to predictive power.
A good overall statistic is the mean absolute correlation of the estimates of a
parameter with all the other parameters with which it might be misidentified.
Ž .We exclude initial attractions and compute correlations among ,  , , N 0 ,
and 	.
For  the mean absolute correlation with the other parameters is .31, .39, and
.23 across the constant-sum, median-action, and beauty-contest games. None of
the correlations with a specific parameter are consistent in magnitude and sign
across games. This indicates that  is well-identified. The same statistics for
Ž .N 0 are .19, .22, and .32. The latter number excludes the correlation between
Ž .N 0 and  in the beauty-contest game, which is nearly one because the
41 Ž .declining-effect constraint is binding. These figures show that N 0 is well-
Ž .identified too except when the constraint binds . The mean absolute correla-
Žtions for  are .48, .30, and .32 the latter again excludes the high correlation
Ž .. Ž .with N 0 . These correlations are somewhat higher than for  and N 0 ,
especially in constant-sum games, indicating possible identification problems.
The most systematic large correlation is between  and , which have an
Žaverage correlation of .88 in the constant-sum games and the correlations are
.nearly equal in all four games . They are also correlated .50 in the median-ac-
Ž .tion game and uncorrelated .03 in the beauty contest game. This pattern of
correlations is a hint that the two depreciation parameters may be fundamen-
tally related, in some games, in a way we hope to explore in further research.
The fact that the intercorrelations among estimates are modest and unsystem-
Ž .atic with noted exceptions confirms that the parameters added in EWA
contribute separately to its fit. We can also ask whether adding these parameters
helps solve identification problems that arise in the belief and reinforcement
special cases. For the reinforcement model, 	 and  are correlated .79, .68,
and .05 in the three classes of games. The large negative correlations arise
because when  is lower attractions decay more rapidly, so 	 must be larger to
magnify small differences in attractions into large differences in choice probabil-
Žities. The same effect does not seem to happen across runs of the beauty-con-
ˆ .test game, where  is 1.38 and none of the models captures learning well.
Therefore, it is difficult to identify separate influences of the two parameters.
41 Ž . Ž . Ž .When the declining-effect constraint N 0 	1 1 is binding, N 0 and  are not identified
Ž .separately. The same is true in the belief model. We regard this as a shred of evidence about the
Žway in which parameters may vary systematically across classes of games see Cheung and Friedman
Ž ..1997 . It may be that dominance-solvable games in which observed strategy choices are constantly
Ž . Ž .shifting location have this general property so the restriction N 0 1 1 can be safely
imposed.
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Ž .Adding  and N 0 in the EWA model reduces the correlations between 	 and
 in magnitude, to.15, .40, and .20, eliminating any possible identification
problem.
Ž .In the belief model the only apparent identification problem is between N 0
and , which are correlated .20, .86, and .99 in the three games. When  is
included in the EWA model, these correlations become .23, .31, and .99, so the
identification problem is partly eliminated.
Overall, there are modest identification problems in all three models. Prob-
lems in the reinforcement and belief models are largely alleviated by introducing
Ž ., N 0 , and  , in EWA. These new parameters are fairly well identified, except
for modest-to-strong correlation between  and  in two of three games. EWA
therefore solves minor identification problems in the simpler models at the
expense of creating another minor one, which could be explored in further
research.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Ž .We proposed a general ‘experience-weighted attraction’ EWA learning
model in which the probability of choosing a strategy is determined by its
relative attraction. A strategy’s attractions are updated by weighting lagged
attractions by the number of periods of ‘experience-equivalence’ they contain,
adding the payoffs actually received or a fraction of the payoffs that would have
been received, then normalizing by an experience weight.
The paper makes two basic contributions.
First, we show that belief learning is not fundamentally different from
reinforcement learning because both are special examples of one general
learning ruleEWA. By showing their common basis, EWA lays bare the
essential components of reinforcement and belief learning, and shows how those
components can be combined to make a better model. Comparing choice
reinforcement to EWA makes it clear that reinforcement assumes players
ignore foregone payoffs, and attractions either cumulate as quickly as possible
Ž . Ž .in some models or average past reinforcements in other models . Comparing
weighted fictitious play to EWA makes it clear that belief models assume initial
attractions are consistent with prior beliefs, foregone and actual payoffs are
equally reinforcing, and attractions are weighted averages of past attractions and
payoffs.
Indeed, as an empirical matter there is no reason to think that the clusters of
parametric restrictions embodied in cumulative choice reinforcement and
weighted fictitious play are the clusters most likely to arise in human behavior.
For example, there is no empirical reason to think that players who ignore
foregone payoffs also cumulate reinforcements, or that players who weight
foregone payoffs necessarily use weighted averages of past attractions. EWA
shows that there are many more clusters of parameter values than the two
special kinds embodied in cumulative reinforcement and weighted fictitious play.
For this reason, perhaps EWA should be studied more extensively in modern
empirical work before these special cases.
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Second, by estimating the more general EWA model, along with reinforce-
ment and belief-learning restrictions, our study combines methodological
strengths of earlier studies while avoiding weaknesses. All earlier studies did one
or more of the following: concentrated on only one or two models, focussed on
one class of games, ignored player heterogeneity, restricted the generality of
models, derived parameter values using methods that do not guarantee best-fits,
or did not report inferential statistics testing relative fit. Our paper had none of
these limits because we compared three general models, on three classes of
games, allowed some heterogeneity, derived parameter values optimally, and
Ž .reported both test statistics adjusting for free parameters three ways and
Ž .out-of-sample predictive accuracy measured two ways .
EWA fits better than the reinforcement models in all cases, and better than
belief learning in most cases, both adjusting for degrees of freedom within-sam-
ple and in out-of-sample prediction. Belief models are more accurate than
reinforcement in some games, and by some measures, and less accurate in
others.
ŽThe foregone payoff weight  is estimated to be .42 averaging across the four
.constant-sum games , .85 in median-action games, and .23 in beauty contests.
The raw average of these numbers, .50, suggests that players generally weight
foregone payoffs about half as much as actual payoffs. This result incorporates
Ž .the intuitions underlying both reinforcement actual payoffs are stronger and
Ž .belief learning foregone payoffs matter . Put differently, players seem to obey
both the law of actual effect and a corollary law of simulated effect.
In the three games, the decay parameters  and  average 1.00 and .94, .80
and 0, and 1.33 and .94. The first two games indicate that sometimes attractions
Ž .are approximately averages as in belief models and other times they cumulate
Ž .as rapidly as possible as in reinforcement . The value of  above one in beauty
contests, as discussed above, reflects a likely misspecification because the
adaptive models with stage-game strategies do not allow players to extrapolate
Žtrends or have sophisticated beliefs a shortcoming the weighted fictitious play
.and reinforcement models also share .
Ž .The initial experience weight N 0 averages 15.80, .65, and 16.82. The large
values in constant-sum and beauty-contest games imply that players learn slowly,
because they give much more weight to lagged attractions than to payoffs. The
low value of .65 in median-action games means players respond more strongly to
payoffs, learning faster.
EWA also exploits the flexibility of initial attractions shared by reinforcement
models, compared to belief models in which initial attractions must be expected
payoffs based on some prior. This flexibility is particularly helpful in the
coordination games.
The results show how EWA is able to ‘gene-splice’ the best features of belief
and reinforcement learning while avoiding their weaknesses. For example, in the
median-action games players begin with dispersed choices that seem to reflect
different selection principles, and converge quickly. Explaining this pattern well
Ž .requires initial attractions that are flexible and cumulate as in reinforcement ,
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rather than belief-based initial attractions that are averages, but also requires
Ž .players to respond strongly to foregone payoffs as in belief learning .
The fact that parameter values vary widely across the data sets is not
surprising, because all studies that have looked for differences in parameters
Ž Ž .across games have found them e.g., Crawford 1995 , Cheung and Friedman
Ž . Ž . Ž ..1997 , Erev and Roth 1997 , Chen and Tang 1998 . Furthermore, the parame-
ters capture different features of the dataspeed of learning and sharpness of
convergence. Since these features are different across games, parameter values
should differ. Nonetheless, our understanding of learning will not be complete
until there is a theory of how parameter values depend on game structure and
Ž Ž .experimental conditions see Cheung and Friedman 1997 for important
.progress . Our estimates provide raw material for such theorizing.
6.1. EWA Extensions
There are many directions for future research.
Theorizing about the kinds of equilibria to which EWA learning rules con-
Ž .verge would be extremely useful. Hart and Mas-Colell 1996 provide a clue.
They study a process in which players shift probability toward strategies they
wish they had played, in proportion to the difference between foregone and
Ž .actual payoffs ‘‘regret’’ . This process is similar to EWA learning because EWA
also shifts probability toward high-regret strategies when  is close to one. Hart
and Mas-Collel prove that their process converges almost surely to correlated
equilibrium for finite normal-form games. Similar results might be derived for
Ž .EWA perhaps for a restricted class of games . Interested theorists might keep
in mind that mapping attractions into probabilities using the ratio form means
the denominator of the updating equation vanishes, so  disappears and the
experience weight only enters if the scale of the initial attractions is restricted.
ŽThen the model can be sensibly reduced to two parameters and  which
.can be set to one for some theoretical purposes which should make theorizing
easier.
An empirical direction for further research is measurement of model parame-
ters using psychological methods. For example, if  is interpreted as attention to
foregone payoffs from unchosen alternatives, then values of  should correlate
with direct measures of attention, such as the amount of time subjects spend
Ž Ž .. Žlooking at different numbers in a payoff matrix see Camerer et al 1993 . In
general, measuring attention to information provides a direct way to test
42 . Ž .theories that assume certain kinds of information are not used. Or if N 0 is
42 For example, choice reinforcement predicts that players do not use information other than their
own payoff history. Experiments that vary the information subjects are given have shown this
Ž Ž . Ž .prediction is clearly wrong Mookerjhee and Sopher 1994 , Van Huyck, Battalio, and Rankin 1996 ,
Ž ..Huck, Normann, Oechssler 1997 . Direct measures of attention provide a more direct test: if
players look at foregone payoffs frequently, then reinforcement models have some explaining to do.
Similarly, all adaptive models predict that players do not use information about others’ payoffs;
looking at those payoffs is evidence of sophistication.
ATTRACTION LEARNING 871
the number of pregame ‘trials’ a player simulates that form prior beliefs, then
Ž .N 0 should be related to the ratio of initial response times to later-period
response times.
EWA will also have to be upgraded to cope with three modelling
challengessophistication, imperfect payoff information, and specification of
strategiesbefore it is generally applicable.
Incorporating sophistication is important because EWA players only use
information about their opponents’ past choices, ignoring information about
payoffs of others. Using this information in an expanded learning rule that
incorporates sophistication could help explain data like those from the beauty-
contest games. Iterating sophistication might also link sophisticated-EWA to
equilibrium theories like quantal-response equilibrium.
Incorporating imperfect payoff information is important because any general
model should be able to explain learning in low-information environments,
where players do not know everything about their own payoffs, opponents’
strategies, etc. EWA can obviously be applied in these settings by fixing 0
Žwhich means EWA can apply to any environment choice to which reinforce-
.ment applies . A more general approach would use imperfect information in
some other way, rather than just giving it zero weight.
Incorporating a richer specification of strategies is important because stage-
game strategies are not always the most natural candidates for the strategies
that players learn about. For example, players may learn by extrapolating from
sequences of observations, or learn about history-dependent repeated-game
Žstrategies or a wide variety of decision rules like minimax, Nash equilibrium, or
Ž ..imitation; e.g., Stahl 1997 . Once a set of richer strategies is specified, of
course, EWA can still model learning about those strategies. The open question,
therefore, is what rules to specify a priori, and how a model can winnow down a
very large set of possible rules as quickly as humans probably do.
Adding these difficult extensions to EWA, and a theory of first-period play to
supply initial attractions, might eventually create a unified way to predict how
people play games in the lab and, eventually, how they play outside as well.
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